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Abstract
Recent trends point to increasing use of social network information by firms and public
agencies for personalized policies. However, the cost of implementation can be high
and the use of personal information can reduce satisfaction. The value of such policies
depends upon network structures, and may be insignificant for certain classes of large
networks. Thus, firms and public agencies may need to be more careful about the design
of mechanisms within social networks.
In this thesis, we focus on a particular application of mechanism design problems
with social network effects, i.e., the pricing problem of a single firm selling a product
to consumers in social networks, and study the value of price discrimination in large
social networks. Recent trends in industry suggest that increasingly firms are using
information about social network to offer personalized prices to individuals based upon
their positions in the social network. In the presence of positive network externalities,
firms aim to increase their profits by offering discounts to influential individuals that
can stimulate consumption by other individuals at a higher price. However, the lack
of transparency in discriminative pricing may reduce consumer satisfaction and create
mistrust. Recent research has focused on the computation of optimal prices in deter-
ministic networks under positive externalities. We would like to answer the question:
how valuable is such discriminative pricing? We find, surprisingly, that the value of such
pricing policies (increase in profits due to price discrimination) in very large random
networks are often not significant. Particularly, for Erdös-Renyi random networks, we
provide the exact rates at which this value decays in the size of the networks for differ-
ent ranges of network densities. Our results show that there is a non-negligible value of
price discrimination for a small class of moderate-sized Erdös-Renyi random networks.
We also present a framework to obtain bounds on the value of price discrimination for
random networks with general degree distributions and apply the framework to obtain
bounds on the value of price discrimination in power-law networks. Our numerical ex-
periments demonstrate our results and suggest that our results are robust to changes in
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We all live in a world with social interactions. These interactions influence our prefer-
ences, decisions, behavior, and our well being. It has been shown by experiments that
peer influence can increase a person’s chance of buying a product (Bapna and Umyarov
2015). Other research (Allcott 2011) shows that including comparison of neighbors’
electricity use in a home energy report can reduce overall energy consumption and cost
effectively change consumer behavior. The widely adopted term for this phenomena is
network effect. Network effect is often not a localized phenomena. Instead, through cas-
cades of influence, network effects can significantly impact human behavior and global
outcomes in social networks, such as the spread of information and ideas, the evolu-
tion and spread of infectious disease, adoption of products, and overall physical and
emotional well being of society. For example, in epidemiology, social interactions can
significantly increase the chance of infections, and the spread of the disease depends
upon the pathogen properties as well as the social contact structure in the population
(Kharkwal et al. 2021). A policy maker can reduce secondary infections if it vaccinates
the hubs in the network and reduces the number of cascades of disease in the network.
Therefore, network effect has received attention in many research fields such as revenue
management, marketing, economics, political science, public health, and so on.
The use of social network information in operations and marketing has become
increasingly prevalent in recent years. The increasing popularity of social platforms,
such as Facebook, Twitter, Wechat and Instagram, has enabled convenient online so-
cial interactions among people. Those social interactions make individuals more likely
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to influence or to be influenced by peers in the social network. In the meantime, the
rapid development of information technology has enabled firms to utilize social net-
work information of their consumers in their marketing and operations decisions. For
example, public agencies, utility companies, and wellness programs can induce peer
pressure within social networks to promote cooperation among individuals (see, e.g.,
Allcott 2011, Mani et al. 2013). There is also evidence showing that political organiza-
tions, for example Cambridge Analytica, utilize social network information to conduct
political campaigns.1 Moreover, it is also reported that firms such as Gilt Groupe
and PALMS resort have been using social network information for targeted advertising,
steering, identifying influencers in the social network for product promotion and viral
marketing.2 Other Internet companies also find using social network information a
potential way to improve their operations and marketing efficiencies.3 Fainmesser
and Galeotti (2020) provide a summary of industrial practice of influencer marketing,
including the use of discriminative/personalized pricing strategies.
Considering network effects changes the decisions made by firms and public agen-
cies, and requires measurement of the networks, which is costly and often very noisy.
Furthermore, there are additional costs and concerns about implementation. People
are often sensitive to others taking advantage of their personal information. Yet, the
decisions and outcomes depend also on the network structures. In a large scale social
experiment (Proestakis et al. 2018), the authors find that the network structure plays an
important role in the effectiveness of public policy decisions. Therefore, decision makers
need to be more careful about the design and performance evaluation of mechanisms in
social networks.
While it may be difficult to say how a particular policy will perform on each network,
it is possible to study the performance of policies on certain class of networks that are
commonly observed. In the thesis, we aim at studying this for different classes of
social networks. For concreteness, we focus on a particular application of mechanism







divisible product with positive network externalities to consumers embedded in a social
network, and evaluate the performance of different pricing policies in certain (large)
social networks. In the following, we will provide more context on pricing with social
network information and introduce the main research questions in this thesis.
1.1 Pricing with Social Network Information
Among the different uses of social network information in operations and marketing,
one important use is in pricing. In many situations, firms would like to sell products to
consumers on the social platform (either their own products or serve as a platform to
sell products of a third party). In such cases, firms may use the information about social
network to inform their pricing decisions. For example, firms would like to know which
individual should be targeted for a particular promotion or which individual might be
willing to pay a higher price. Apparently, such information is very helpful for firms
to wisely use their resources (e.g., campaign budget or limited webpage space) to the
maximal benefit.
However, despite the potential benefit, the use of social network information in pric-
ing has raised serious concerns. For government agencies, such practices inherently
cause inequity and may violate certain regulations (see, e.g., Obama White House Re-
port 2015). Consumers are concerned about their privacy as well as the prospect that
they might be offered a higher price than their peers.4 Given such concerns, firms
face the dilemma of whether to use social network information in their pricing decisions
or not. To solve the dilemma, it is important for the firm to understand how much
potential gain there is from the use of social network information in pricing — if the
gain is small, then there may not be much motivation for such practices in the first
place.
This thesis aims to shed light on the above question. Specifically, we investigate how
much value can be added if the firm utilizes social network information to inform their
pricing decisions (to offer personalized prices based on the positions of the individuals
in a social network). In particular, we try to answer the following questions.
4 See https://hbr.org/2018/05/when-customers-are-and-arent-ok-with-personalized-pric
es for results from a large-scale experiment.
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1. Given a specific social network, what is the value for the firm to offer personal-
ized pricing to each individual consumer compared to offer a uniform price to all
consumers?
2. What is the value of information about the network structure if used for pricing?
3. Which type of network (structure) will generate more additional value if the firm
uses discriminative pricing?
To answer these questions, we consider a model that is widely used in operations
management to study pricing decisions under network effects. In the model, there is
a network of consumers. Each consumer may influence other consumers with different
weights. The firm sells a divisible product to all consumers, and it has the ability
to offer personalized prices to each individual consumer (e.g., by showing personalized
coupons or promotions). Each consumer has a utility function that depends on the
purchased amount of the product by him/herself as well as the purchase amount by
his/her neighbors in the social network.
Then we consider two pricing strategies for the firm. In the first strategy, the firm
knows the social network structure and utilizes this information to offer personalized
prices to maximize its profit. In the second strategy, the firm does not apply personalized
offering and simply offers a uniform price to all consumers. Note that not offering
personalized prices may be due to ignorance of the network structure or simply because
the firm decides not to offer personalized prices. Under our model assumptions, the
optimal uniform price does not depend on the network information; so if the firm decides
not to offer personalized prices, then it can set prices ignoring the network effects. In
either case, the consumers decide the purchase amount based on their utility function
(with network influences). Then we compare the profits obtained by the firm using these
two strategies (namely, optimal personalized prices versus optimal uniform prices). The
difference of the two profits will be the value of price discrimination. It can also be
viewed as the value of network information for the corresponding network.
The value of price discrimination is always non-negative. Nevertheless, the mag-
nitude of the value depends largely on the network structure. First, we find that for
certain networks, there is no value of price discrimination. That is, for those networks,
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even if the firm knows the network structure and can offer discriminative prices, the op-
timal action is to offer a uniform price for all consumers. We identify a critical property
for this class of networks — the number of walks of any given length starting from each
node must be equal to the number of walks of the same length ending at that node.
This result gives a precise characterization of when the value of price discrimination is
zero for a given network.
Having understood the value of price discrimination for a given network, we further
consider the value of price discrimination for random networks. In particular, we focus
on a class of random networks — the Erdös-Renyi networks. In an Erdös-Renyi network,
a consumer has a unit influence on another consumer with a certain probability (we call
it the influence probability). We consider the asymptotic value of price discrimination
for large Erdös-Renyi networks (the relative improvement in profit of discriminative
pricing over uniform pricing). We have the following findings for Erdös-Renyi networks:
1. When the influence probability is below a certain threshold, the asymptotic value
of price discrimination increases with the influence probability.
2. When the influence probability is above a certain threshold, the asymptotic value
of price discrimination decreases with the influence probability.
3. We identify the range of the influence probability in which the asymptotic value
of price discrimination reaches the maximum.
4. In all cases, the value of price discrimination is asymptotically vanishing as the
network size becomes large.
To explain our results, we note that when the network is very sparse (the influence
probability is below a threshold), the network is very fragmented and the social influ-
ence of any individual is contained within his/her closest neighbors, leading to small
gains from price discrimination (we show that the gain of discriminative pricing depends
largely on the number of long paths in the network); when the network is very dense
(the influence probability is above a threshold), the network becomes very balanced, also
leading to small value of price discrimination (we show that the existence of cycles will
reduce the gain of discriminative pricing); when the density of network is intermediate,
there exists long paths but not as many cycles, and the value of price discrimination
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reaches its maximum. However, even at the maximum, the value of discriminative pric-
ing still asymptotically decays to zero, indicating that for large Erdös-Renyi networks,
with high chance, there is little value of applying discriminative prices. Meanwhile,
complementary to the asymptotic results, we find that for Erdös-Renyi networks with a
certain range of influence probability, the rate at which the value of price discrimination
decays is slow, suggesting that the value of price discrimination may be non-negligible
for small- or moderate-sized networks.
We also extend our analysis to random networks with general degree distributions.
Specifically, we provide a general framework to obtain upper bounds for the value of price
discrimination, based on the maximum degrees and the second moments of the degree
distributions of the random networks. As an application of this general framework,
we investigate the asymptotic value of price discrimination for random networks with
power-law degree distributions. We show that for power-law networks, the value of
price discrimination asymptotically vanishes as the size of the network increases. More
specifically, we provide the rates of the decay for power-law networks with different
ranges of parameters. These results suggest that the value of price discrimination may
not be significant for a broader class of large random networks.
In addition to our theoretical results, we perform numerical experiments to demon-
strate our results. We first use synthetic data and show that the numerical results match
our theoretical results. Then we use social networks from real data sets (that are often
not Erdös-Renyi networks) to compute the value of price discrimination. We show that
for large networks, the value of price discrimination is often quite small. However, for
moderate-sized networks, there could be an non-negligible value of price discrimination.
To show the robustness of our results, we also numerically test variants of our model
and observe similar results.
1.2 Thesis Outline
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review related
literature to social networks and marketing strategies in social networks. In Chapter
3, we introduce the basic model considered in this thesis. In Chapter 4, we study the
conditions under which there is no value of price discrimination. Then in Chapter 5,
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we consider a class of random networks — the Erdös-Renyi networks and study the
asymptotic value of price discrimination. We present the main results in Chapter 5.1
and provide the key proof concepts in Chapter 5.2. In Chapter 6, we provide a general
framework to study the value of price discrimination in general random networks and
apply the framework to power-law networks. We conducts some numerical experiments
in Chapter 7. Finally, we conclude the thesis in Chapter 8. The technical proofs can be
found in Appendix A.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
The study of network effects has been an active research topic in recent years. Through
cascades of influence, network effects can shape critical outcomes in a social network
such as the spread of information, ideas and disease (see, e.g., Pastor-Satorras and
Vespignani 2001, Chamley 2004, Banerjee et al. 2013, Muchnik et al. 2013), choice or
adoption of products by consumers (see, e.g., Rogers 1976, Bapna and Umyarov 2015,
Wang and Wang 2017), social choice (see, e.g., Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1992),
overall physical and emotional well being of the society (see, e.g., Christakis and Fowler
2007, Mani et al. 2013), and so on.
Our work is related to the literature considering positive network externalities, as
introduced in Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1985). Specifically,
our work is related to the work on optimal marketing strategies with positive network
externalities. There are often two objectives in such studies, one aims at influence
maximization across the network, while the other aims at revenue maximization. In the
following, we discuss the literature on both streams.
Influence maximization problems consider diffusion of influence, and aim at identi-
fying the best seeds to maximize the spread of social influence. For example, Domingos
and Richardson (2001) introduce the concept of influence maximization in virtual mar-
keting by initially targeting the seeds and then triggering the influence cascade among
consumers. Such problems have been widely studied subsequently in various settings,
see, e.g., Richardson and Domingos (2002) and Banerjee et al. (2013). Particularly,
Kempe et al. (2003) show that this problem is computationally complex, and provide
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provable approximation algorithm for the problem. Recently, Akbarpour et al. (2018)
consider the value of network information for diffusion problems and suggest that a ran-
dom seeding strategy with a few more seeds can prompt a larger cascade than optimally
targeting, the result of which is similar in spirit to ours but in a different setting.
Our work mainly belongs to the revenue maximization stream. Revenue maximiza-
tion problems not only consider the diffusion of influence, but also aim at maximizing
the revenue. In this stream, there has been much research on efficient marketing strate-
gies using network effects, especially on the influence, exploit or pricing strategy in the
setting of sequential purchase decisions (see, e.g., Hartline et al. 2008, Arthur et al.
2009, Haghpanah et al. 2013, Crapis et al. 2016, Zhou and Chen 2018). Such problems
are often computationally complex and most literature focus on the computational ap-
proaches for such problems. There are also a significant amount of works on pricing in
the presence of network effect and simultaneous purchase decisions (see, e.g., Campbell
2013, Du et al. 2016, Chen et al. 2018, Cohen and Harsha 2020). Again, most such
research focus on the computational aspects of the problem.
Our work is closely related to the static pricing problem of selling a divisible product
to a group of consumers with positive network externalities, in particular, the works of
Candogan et al. (2012), Bloch and Quérou (2013) and Fainmesser and Galeotti (2015).
In particular, we build upon the model in Candogan et al. (2012) which is a deterministic
model and we introduce structural randomness in the model. These works consider a
two-stage game, in which the monopolist first chooses the prices and then the consumers,
embedded in a social network, make purchasing decisions simultaneously. Candogan
et al. (2012) and Bloch and Quérou (2013) assume full network information, while
Fainmesser and Galeotti (2015) assume incomplete network information and consider
a configuration network model. Candogan et al. (2012) and Fainmesser and Galeotti
(2015) consider the amount of consumption of the consumers and assume quadratic
utility in the consumption quantity, while Bloch and Quérou (2013) primarily consider a
binary purchase decision and assume a linear utility function. In these works, prices can
be set differently based upon individuals’ positions in the social network. The question
of interest is to characterize and identify optimal prices and profits in the networks and
the complexity of computing optimal prices. In contrast, our main goal is to quantify
the value of price discrimination, that is, to understand how much potential value can
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be added by discriminative pricing. We notice a few recent papers addressing similar
problems, but in different settings and approaches. For example, Momot et al. (2020)
compare the value of degree-information and conspicuity-information in the setting of
selective selling of exclusive products with negative network externalities. Alizamir et al.
(2018) analyze a firm’s optimal pricing problem for a new service with local network
effect in a non-stationary dynamic setting, and study the impact of network structure
on the firm’s revenue and pricing decisions. In contrast, our work studies the value of
discriminative pricing in random social networks.
Our work is also connected to some literature in marketing and economics, such as
network games (see, e.g., Ballester et al. 2006, Sundararajan 2007, Galeotti et al. 2010)
and personalized pricing with heterogeneous customer valuations (see, e.g., Choudhary
et al. 2005, Elmachtoub et al. 2021). Moreover, in developing the asymptotic value of
price discrimination in random networks, we establish connections with graph theory
and random graph theory, in particular, the literature on counting the number of walks
of different lengths in a network (see, e.g., Fiol and Garriga 2009, Levin and Peres 2017),
on spectral graph theory (see, e.g., Krivelevich and Sudakov 2003, Chung et al. 2004,
Preciado and Rahimian 2017), and on network centrality (see, e.g., Bonacich 1987). We
will illustrate more detailed connections to these literatures when discussing the proofs
of our theoretical results.
Chapter 3
Model
In this chapter, we introduce our monopolist-consumer model with network externali-
ties. We characterize the consumption equilibrium, optimal discriminative pricing, and
optimal uniform pricing under our model. We also define the value of price discrimina-
tion based on the increase in the profit under optimal discriminative pricing over that
under optimal uniform pricing, namely the regret and the fractional regret.
3.1 Basic Model
We consider the pricing problem of a monopolist who sells a divisible product to con-
sumers in a social network. Our basic model is motivated by Candogan et al. (2012),
Bloch and Quérou (2013) and Fainmesser and Galeotti (2015). In our model, there are
n consumers in a directed social network with non-empty adjacency matrix G ∈ Rn×n≥0 .
The element Gij represents the influence of consumer j on consumer i. The monopolist
chooses a price pi for each consumer i, and each consumer i chooses the consump-
tion level xi. The preferences of the consumers are represented by the following utility
function:






where x−i is a vector representing the consumption levels of all consumers other than
i, ‖G + GT ‖ is the spectral norm of (G + GT ), a > 0 is a constant representing the
strength of stand-alone utility, and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a positive network externality coefficient
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representing the strength of network effect.
Our model is built upon the model in Candogan et al. (2012), except that we assume





function to normalize the network effect (this is necessary as we will later extend the
model into a sequence of pricing problems over growing networks), and we introduce
ρ as the network externality coefficient. The introduction of ρ is consistent with the
model in Bloch and Quérou (2013) and Fainmesser and Galeotti (2015). As for the
network information, our model is accordant with Candogan et al. (2012) and Bloch
and Quérou (2013) in assuming full network information, i.e., the adjacency matrix G.
We focus on the discriminative pricing strategy based upon network positions. To
block other unnecessary idiosyncrasies, we assume that all consumers have identical
preferences and their decisions differ only because of their positions in the network,
i.e., a and ρ are homogeneous across consumers. With the homogeneous assumption,
we can isolate the impact of network structure and avoid confounding effects due to
heterogeneity among consumers. The consumers choose their consumption levels that
maximize their utilities given the prices offered to them and the consumption levels of
their peers in the network. Thus the consumers are in a consumption game that is
completely represented by {N , [0,∞)i∈N , {ui}i∈N }, where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is the set of
consumers, [0,∞) is the set of possible consumption levels for each consumer, and ui is
the utility function for consumer i. The utility function {ui}i∈N for each consumer i is
completely identified given the parameters a, ρ, price vector p ∈ Rn and the network
adjacency matrix G. According to Candogan et al. (2012), given a, ρ and G, there is a










This equilibrium is well defined because
(
I − 2ρ‖G+GT ‖G
)
is a positive definite matrix.
This is because ρ < 1, and the spectral norm of 2G is at most the spectral norm of(
G+GT
)
(see Theorem 2 in Fan 1950). The assumption ρ < 1 is weaker than Assump-
tion 1 in Candogan et al. (2012) which requires that the row sums of the adjacency
matrix G be uniformly bounded by twice the quadratic coefficient in the utility func-
tion (which is 1 in our model). If ρ < 1 is violated, then
(
I − 2ρ‖G+GT ‖G
)−1
may not
be well defined and it would lead to an equilibrium where consumers consume infinite
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quantity.
Next, we consider the seller’s problem. We assume that the monopolistic seller
can observe the network structure and can produce arbitrary quantity at a constant
marginal cost c < a. Then the monopolist’s pricing problem is defined as:
maxp (p− c1)Tx∗(p).























































where K (G,α) = (I − αG)−1 1 =
∑∞
i=0 (αG)
i 1 is the Bonacich centrality vector pro-
posed in Bonacich (1987). According to the definition, the Bonacich centrality of con-
sumer i is the discounted sum of weighted walks of all lengths ending at consumer i. The
discount factor exponentially decreases in the length of the walk (for a walk of length
k, the discount factor is αk where α is the discount rate) and the weight of a walk is the
product of the weights of the edges in the walk. In particular, if the adjacency matrix
G is binary, then all walks have weight 1 and the Bonacich centrality of consumer i is
the discounted sum of number of walks of all lengths ending at consumer i.
We point out that the optimal price vector (3.2) consists of three parts: a common
charge for all consumers (the first term), a markup term proportional to the influence
received by the consumers (the second term), and a discount term proportional to
the influence a consumer exerts on other consumers (the third term). A consumer
influencing more central peers gets a higher discount than a consumer influencing less
central peers; and a consumer influenced by more central peers gets a higher mark up
than a consumer influenced by less central peers. This structure has also been observed
in Candogan et al. (2012), Bloch and Quérou (2013) and Fainmesser and Galeotti (2015).
Plugging the optimal price into the objective function, we have that the optimal profit
14

































We note that the optimal profit is proportional to the discounted sum of weighted walks
of all lengths in the network with the adjacency matrix (G+GT ).
In practice, the monopolist may not be able to provide discriminative pricing due to
various reasons. In such cases, under the assumption that c < a, according to Candogan





We note that the optimal uniform price vector does not depend on the network infor-
mation.1 This implies that there is no value of network information if the monopolist
cannot use discriminative pricing. However, this does not imply that the monopolist’s
profit under optimal uniform price vector is independent of the network structure. Ac-





























Thus the monopolist’s profit using optimal uniform price is proportional to the dis-
counted sum of weighted walks of all lengths in the directed network with adjacency
matrix G. We next introduce the performance metrics used to evaluate pricing policies.
3.2 Regret and Fractional Regret
We define the monopolist’s regret for a price vector p as the difference between the
optimal profit and the profit under the price vector p. That is, the regret of the
1 Without the assumption that all consumers have identical preferences, the optimal uniform price
vector may depend on the network structure G.
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monopolist under price vector p is given by
R(p) = π∗ − π(p),
where π(p) = (p− c1)Tx∗(p) and x∗(p) is defined in (3.1).
We also consider another performance metric — the fractional regret. The fractional
regret of the monopolist under price vector p is




The value of price discrimination can now be evaluated using the two performance
metrics. We will consider the following two metrics to quantify the value of price
discrimination:


























2. Monopolist’s fractional regret under optimal uniform pricing, i.e.,
RF (p0) = 1−
1T
(









Since the monopolist does not use the network information for optimal uniform
pricing, the value of price discrimination is also the value of network information. This
equivalence is important because collecting and using network information may be op-
erationally expensive for the monopolist and may create consumer privacy concerns.
With the value of price discrimination, one can answer whether the cost of collecting
network information is justified.
Chapter 4
Value of Price Discrimination for
Deterministic Networks
In this chapter, we study how the network structure plays a role in determining the
value of price discrimination. In particular, we provide a characterization of networks
for which there is no value of price discrimination. This does not imply that the network
effect is absent but that price discrimination does not generate additional profit in
those networks. In Candogan et al. (2012), the authors show that when the network
G is symmetric, the optimal discriminative price vector equals the optimal uniform
price vector, suggesting that there is no value of price discrimination if the network is
symmetric. Therefore, symmetry is a sufficient condition under which there is no value
of price discrimination. However, we find that there is a larger class of networks with
no value of price discrimination, with symmetric networks forming a subclass.
In the following, we use the monopolist’s regret under uniform pricing R(p0) as the
measure of value of price discrimination. We make the following definition.
Definition 4.1 (Price Discrimination Free Network). A network is a price discrimina-
tion free network if for any ρ ∈ (0, 1), a > c > 0, the value of price discrimination is
zero, i.e., R(p0) = 0.
In the following, we study necessary and sufficient conditions for a network to be price
discrimination free. At first sight, the price discrimination free property should have
some connection with certain “symmetric” properties of networks such as symmetry,
16
17
identical centrality for nodes or balanced in-degree and out-degrees for nodes. However,
as the following five examples show, none of these properties is equivalent to the price
discrimination free property. In all the examples below, we assume that all edges have
weight 1, and that a = 5, c = 4 and ρ = 0.9.
Figure 4.1: Example networks.
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Example 4.1 (Identical Centrality Is Not A Necessary Condition). Firstly, we consider
an example to show that identical Bonacich centrality for each node is not a necessary
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condition for a network to be price discrimination free. We consider the example in
Figure 4.1a. In Table 4.1, we present the adjacency matrix, the centrality vector (based
on G and (G+GT )), the optimal prices, and the regret under p0 for this network. As
can be seen, in this network, the centrality of the consumer in the center is different
from (larger than) the centrality of other consumers. However, the optimal prices are
same for all consumers (this can also be seen by noting that the network is symmetric
and according to Candogan et al. 2012, symmetric network leads to identical prices).
Therefore, identical Bonacich centrality is not a necessary condition for a network to be
price discrimination free.
Example 4.2 (Symmetry Is Not A Necessary Condition). Secondly, we consider an
example to show that symmetry is not a necessary condition for a network to be price
discrimination free. We consider the example in Figure 4.1b and we summarize the
results for this network in Table 4.2. It is easily seen that the network is a directed
cycle and is not symmetric. However, the optimal prices are the same. Therefore,
symmetry is not a necessary condition for a network to be price discrimination free;
however, it is a sufficient condition as shown in Candogan et al. (2012).
Example 4.3 (Same In-Degree and Out-Degree Is Not A Sufficient Condition). Next,
we consider an example to show that the in-degree of each node equals its out-degree is
19
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not a sufficient condition for a network to be price discrimination free (even for binary
networks). We consider the example in Figure 4.1c. Table 4.3 presents a summary
of results for this network. It is easy to see that for each node in this network, its
in-degree and out-degree are the same. However, the optimal prices are different and
there is positive value of price discrimination for this network. Therefore, having same
in-degree and out-degree for each node in a network is not a sufficient condition for a
network to be price discrimination free. (Later we will show that same in-degree and
out-degree for each node is a necessary condition.)
Example 4.4 (Identical G-Based Centrality Is Not A Sufficient Condition). Then, we
consider an example to show that all nodes have identical G-based Bonacich centrality
(meaning the Bonacich centrality of G) is not a sufficient condition for a network to be
price discrimination free. We consider the example in Figure 4.1d, and we summarize the
results for this network in Table 4.4. As shown in Table 4.4, each node in this network
has the same Bonacich centrality under adjacency matrix G, but the optimal prices are
different and there is value of price discrimination for this network. Essentially, having



















1 = (β − 1)1,
which implies that all nodes in the network G have the same in-degree. Therefore,
having identical G-based Bonacich centrality or having the same in-degree for each
node is not a sufficient condition for a network to be price discrimination free.
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Example 4.5 (Identical (G + GT )-Based Centrality Is Not A Sufficient Condition).
Last, we consider an example to show that every node has the same (G + GT )-based
Bonacich centrality (meaning the Bonacich centrality of (G + GT )) is not a sufficient
condition for a network to be price discrimination free. We consider the example in
Figure 4.1e. Table 4.5 shows the results for this network. From Table 4.5, we can see
that each node in this network has the same Bonacich centrality based on (G+GT ), but
the optimal prices are not the same and there is value of price discrimination for this
network. In fact, following similar arguments in Example 4.4, having the same (G+GT )-
based Bonacich centrality is equivalent to having the same degrees for all nodes in the
multigraph (G+GT ). Therefore, having identical (G+GT )-based Bonacich centrality,
or equivalently, having the same degree for all nodes in the multigraph (G+GT ), is not
a sufficient condition for a network to be price discrimination free.
We also point out that, identical centrality based on both G and (G + GT ) is a
sufficient condition for a network to be price discrimination free. To see this, we note that
having the same G-based Bonacich centrality is equivalent to G1 = α1 for some constant
α, and having the same (G+GT )-based Bonacich centrality is equivalent to (G+GT )1 =
β1 for some constant β. Combining the two conditions yields GT1 = (β − α)1. Since
1TG1 = 1TGT1, therefore G1 = GT1 = α1 and β = 2α. From equation (3.2), having
the same (G + GT )-based Bonacich centrality and G1 = GT1 = α1 together give the
same optimal price for all the nodes in the network. Therefore, identical centrality based
on both G and (G+GT ) is a sufficient condition for a network to be price discrimination
free.
The above examples show that some intuitive condition is not enough to determine
whether a network is price discrimination free or not. In the following, we present our
main result, which shows that the price discrimination free property is closely related
to the balance of walks from and to each node in the network. We have the following
theorem.





for each positive integer k.
The detailed proof of Theorem 4.1 is provided in Appendix A.1. Theorem 4.1 sug-
gests that, G is a price discrimination free network if and only if for any consumer in
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the network G and any k, the total weight of incoming walks of length k equals the
total weight of outgoing walks of the same length. This shows that the price discrimina-
tion free property is not a local property (restricted to the characteristics of immediate
neighborhood as the symmetry or the same in-degree and out-degree properties are),
but a global property. It also shows that same in-degree and out-degree for each node
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a network to be a price discrimination
free network. However, when the network (G + GT ) is regular, this condition is also
sufficient as shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. If (G+GT ) is a regular network, then G is a price discrimination free
network if and only if G1 = GT1, or the in-degree equals the out-degree for each node.
The corollary immediately follows from Theorem 4.1. When (G + GT ) is regular,
for each node in G, if the in-degree and out-degree are equal, then the total weight of
incoming walks of any arbitrary length k equals the total weight of outgoing walks of
the same length (thus satisfying the condition for Theorem 4.1). Corollary 4.1 provides
a simple test for regular networks. However, it may be difficult to obtain such simple
tests for general networks. Using a test based upon evaluating the weights of smaller
walks, a bound on the fractional regret may be obtained as a function of the positive
network externality coefficient ρ. For example, if for each node and each k ≤ K, the
total weight of incoming walks of length k is equal to the total weight of outgoing walks
of the same length for the node, i.e., Gk1 = (GT )k1 for each k ≤ K, then the fractional
regret RF (p0) is bounded by ρ
2K+1. The statement follows from the proof of Theorem
4.1 in Appendix A.1. A family of tests could help characterize networks with “small”
value of price discrimination. Such a family of tests is beyond the scope of this thesis
and is an interesting future direction of research.
Chapter 5
Value of Price Discrimination for
Erdös-Renyi Random Networks
In Chapter 4, we study conditions under which there exists value of price discrimination
for a deterministic network. In this chapter, we study the value of price discrimination in
random networks. We conduct an asymptotic analysis. That is, we consider a sequence
of networks indexed by n. In the nth network, there are n consumers embedded in a
random network G(n) and for each network G(n), we consider the same pricing problem
as described in Chapter 3. We assume a, c and ρ are the same for each pricing problem
in the sequence. Specifically, the utility for consumer i in the nth network is







where x(n) is the vector representing the consumption profile and p(n) is the price vec-
tor in the nth pricing problem. We denote x∗(n,p(n)) as the consumption equilibrium,
p∗(n) as the optimal price vector, π∗(n) as the optimal profit, p0(n) as the optimal uni-
form price vector,1 π0(n) as the profit under optimal uniform pricing, R(p0(n)) as the
monopolist’s regret under optimal uniform pricing and RF (p0(n)) as the monopolist’s
fractional regret under optimal uniform pricing in the nth pricing problem.
We focus on a special class of random networks — the directed Erdös-Renyi network.
1 The optimal uniform price for each consumer is a+c
2
. The optimal uniform price vectors for
different n differ only in the dimension of the vectors.
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A directed Erdös-Renyi network G(n, p(n)) is a directed, binary random network with n
nodes, where links between ordered pairs of nodes exist independently with a probability
p(n) (we allow p(n) to be a function of n). More precisely, the adjacency matrix of a
directed Erdös-Renyi network G(n, p(n)) is a random binary matrix satisfying
Gij(n, p(n)) =
1, with probability p(n)0, with probability 1− p(n)
for i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, andGii(n, p(n)) = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. We note that the sample
networks G(n, p(n)) are usually not symmetric. We call p(n) the influence probability
among consumers, it also represents the expected density of the random network.
Given that the networks are random, the performance metrics, including the mo-
nopolist’s regret and fractional regret under optimal uniform pricing, are random. We
are interested in the asymptotic properties of the performance metrics. In particular,
we are interested in the expected value of these random performance metrics as n grows
large.
5.1 Main Results
We now introduce our main results. A sketch of the proofs is presented in Section 5.2
with the complete proofs provided in the appendix.
Our first result shows that for any network density sequence (p(n))n∈N, the monop-
olist’s expected fractional regret vanishes asymptotically. For simplicity of representa-
tion, we will represent the sequence (p(n))n∈N as p(n), as needed. We have the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Given any sequence of network densities p(n), for the sequence of Erdös-
Renyi random networks, the expected regret EG[R(p0)] = o(n), and the expected frac-
tional regret EG[RF (p0)] = o(1).
Theorem 5.1 shows that for Erdös-Renyi networks, the expected regret grows sub-
linearly in the size of the network, and the expected fractional regret vanishes asymp-
totically. This implies that the value of price discrimination is negligible asymptotically,
and the optimal uniform pricing is good enough to guarantee almost all of the monopo-
list’s profit when the size of the network grows large enough, irrespective of the network
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density. We note that the optimal uniform price p0(n) =
a+c
2 1 is independent of the
network structure. This implies that the monopolist does not even need to invest ef-
fort to learn the underlying social networks in the asymptotic regime. We provide the
detailed proof of Theorem 5.1 in Appendix A.4.
Theorem 5.1 is powerful because it does not put any constraints on the sequence
p(n), but as a result the uniform upper bound on the expected regret and expected
fractional regret is loose. In the following, we present tighter asymptotic bounds of
expected regret and expected fractional regret for specific ranges of p(n). Note that
asymptotically, Erdös-Renyi networks are empty almost surely if p(n) = O(n−2) (see
Erdos and Rényi 1960). In this range of network densities, there is no network effect and
thus no value of price discrimination. Therefore, in the following discussions, we are only
interested in the range where p(n) = ω(n−2). Specifically, we consider three different





some ε > 0 (in the random graph literature, such networks are often called very sparse
networks); (ii) expected in/out degree stays asymptotically bounded and positive, i.e.,
p(n) = Θ(n−1) (in the random graph literature, such networks are often called critically
sparse networks); and (iii) expected in/out degree asymptotically grows faster than





(in the random graph literature, such networks are often
called dense networks).





ε > 0. We have the following results.




for some ε > 0 and p(n) = ω(n−2), the ex-




, and the expected fractional regret EG[RF (p0)] =
Θ (np(n)).
Now we provide some explanations for the results in Theorem 5.2. Probabilistically,
the networks in this case are acyclic, extremely sparse and fragmented. In such cases, the
effect of any consumer’s purchase is restricted to the consumers in the same component
in the network. With increasing network density, the size of the components grows and a
central consumer is able to influence a larger set of consumers without being influenced
by them. Due to this growing imbalance, with increasing network density in this range,
the expected regret and expected fractional regret increase. The detailed proof of this
case is given in Appendix A.4.
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Next we consider the case of critically sparse networks, where p(n) = Θ(n−1).












In this range of p(n), a sharp phase transition happens. According to Janson et al.












, small components merge to
form a giant component containing a positive fraction of consumers in the network and
cycles emerge. While the emergence of giant component increases the value of price dis-
crimination, the emergence of cycles reduces this value. However, there are not enough
cycles in the network to balance the influence and the effects of giant components and
longer paths dominate. Therefore in this range of p(n), the value of price discrimination




for some ε > 0. Again, the detailed
proof is given in Appendix A.4.






















In this range of p(n), the network is connected with high probability, contains many
cycles and is asymptotically regular and balanced. The in/out degree distribution is
tightly concentrated around the average degree and converges asymptotically to a nor-
mal distribution. Therefore, networks in this range of densities have very small value
of price discrimination. Furthermore, as the network gets denser, the value of price dis-
crimination decreases. This is because the coefficient of variation of the in/out degree
distribution becomes smaller, leading to a more balanced network. The detailed proof
is given in Appendix A.4.
In summary, we found that under different ranges of p(n), the expected regret and
expected fractional regret under the optimal uniform pricing strategy follow different
rates. When p(n) is relatively small or relatively large, there is not much value of price
discrimination. For sparser networks, the value of price discrimination increases in
density and for denser networks, the value of price discrimination decreases in density.
The value of price discrimination reaches its maximum in the range where the average
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degree np(n) is asymptotically bounded away from zero and is growing slower than the
logarithm of n. We summarize our main results in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: The value of price discrimination for different ranges of network densities.






































While the proofs of the main results are quite complicated and are presented in the
appendix, we provide a sketch of those proofs and intermediate results in this sec-
tion. Random networks demonstrate very different properties for different densities and
therefore the techniques to quantify the rates of regret/fractional regret are different
for different ranges of network densities, even though an overarching theme emerges in
the proofs. The proof of Theorem 5.1 uses a combination of techniques used to prove
Theorems 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 with some additional complexity, so we will focus on the
sketch of the proofs of Theorems 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 in this section.
Overall, our proof technique relies on decomposing the profit and regret into compo-
nents corresponding to walks of different lengths and then estimating each component.
The following is the outline for the rest of this section.
1. In Section 5.2.1, we introduce two important quantities used in the proofs, namely
the profit contribution from walks of different lengths and the regret contribution
from walks of different lengths. We also demonstrate how these quantities behave
for different network densities. Then based on these concepts, we give a high level
summary of the proof ideas.
2. In Section 5.2.2, we introduce the techniques for obtaining the upper bounds on
the expected regrets. To quantify the profit contributions and regret contributions
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from walks of different lengths, we need to characterize the asymptotic behavior of
the largest eigenvalue of the multigraph (G(n)+G(n)T ), and the number of walks
of different lengths in the multigraph (G(n)+G(n)T ) and network G(n). We build
upon literature on the spectra of Erdös-Renyi random networks to characterize
the asymptotic behavior of the largest eigenvalue of (G(n) + G(n)T ). We then
introduce novel techniques to quantify the number of walks of different lengths in
random networks.
3. In Section 5.2.3, we introduce our approach for obtaining matching lower bounds.
Our approach relies on counting short walks and small components in random
networks.
5.2.1 Profit Contribution and Regret Contribution
Before introducing the definition of profit contribution and regret contribution, we first
define the concept of value of network effect.
Definition 5.1 (Value of Network Effect). The value of network effect for the monopo-
list is the additional expected profit the monopolist can generate under optimal pricing


































is the optimal profit when there is no network effect,
which is obtained by substituting G(n) with an all-zero matrix in the optimal profit
equation (3.3). The value of network effect is a natural upper bound on the expected
regret. It turns out, as we show in the proof of Theorem 5.2, that this upper bound is
tight for sparse networks as it matches the lower bound. According to equation (5.2),
the value of network effect can be decomposed into the profit contributions from walks
of different lengths. The profit contribution from walks of length k is the kth term in
the series represented in equation (5.2), which is proportional to the number of walks
of length k when controlling for the spectral norm of the multigraph (G(n) + G(n)T ).
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We note that by the definition of spectral norm, for any non-empty network G(n) and






1 ≤ n, (5.3)





1, for any given k, is attained when (G(n)+
G(n)T ) is regular (all row sums are equal).2 Therefore, the value of network effect
defined in equation (5.2) satisfies the following inequality:
















Correspondingly, the regret contribution from walks of length k is the difference
between the profit contribution from walks of length k and the expected value of the




















The profit contribution and the regret contribution from longer walks asymptotically
decay exponentially because ρ < 1. Most of the value of network effect and the re-
gret come from contributions from shorter walks. For better illustration of the profit
contribution and regret contribution from walks of different lengths, we provide some
numerical results in Figure 5.1. These results are obtained by generating N = 100





n }. We choose a = 2, c = 0.5, and ρ = 0.8 in the numerical experiments.
For each realization of G(n, p(n)) and each k, we compute the corresponding profit con-
tribution and regret contribution from walks of length k, and plot the average values in
Figure 5.1. From Figure 5.1, the profit contribution from walks of length k decays as
k increases for all network densities; and for any given k, the profit contribution from
walks of length k increases with network density. The regret contribution from walks of











1 ≤ 1T1 = n, and the equality holds only when 1
is the largest eigenvector of (G(n) + G(n)T )k. This is equivalent to that (G(n) + G(n)T ) is a regular
graph.
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length k is unimodular. For k = 0 and 1, the regret contribution is 0. As k increases,
the regret contribution from walks of length k initially increases. This is because the
expected number of walks of length k in the multigraph (G(n)+G(n)T ) increases faster
than the 2k times the expected number of walks in the network G(n) due to imbalance
in the network. However, as k passes a certain threshold, the regret contribution from
walks of length k starts decreasing in k. Furthermore, the location of the peak increases
with the density of the network, suggesting that when quantifying (approximating) the
expected regret of denser networks, regret contributions from longer walks should be
considered. We also observe that when we move from very sparse networks to critically
sparse networks, the peak value increases (because there are increasing number of longer
walks while there are not many cycles); but when we move further to denser networks,
the peak value decreases sharply (because there are increasing number of cycles). The
observations are consistent with the results in Theorems 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 and will be
formalized in the proofs.
Figure 5.1: Average profit contribution and regret contribution from walks of different
lengths in Erdös-Renyi networks (n = 100000, ρ = 0.8)
(a) Average profit contribution (b) Average regret contribution
With the above definitions, we provide some high-level proof ideas. First, we note
that the profit contribution from walks of any length k dominates the regret contribu-
tion from walks of length k. Therefore, the value of network effect is a natural upper
bound on the expected regret. For very sparse networks discussed in Theorem 5.2, the
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value of network effect turns out to be of the same order as the expected regret and
therefore the bound is tight. For critically sparse networks discussed in Theorem 5.3,
the regret contribution from walks of length 1 is zero. Therefore, we use the total profit
contribution from walks of length greater than 1 as the upper bound on the expected
regret. It turns out that the bound is also tight in this range because we are able to
find a matching lower bound.
For denser networks in Theorem 5.4, the profit contributions from longer walks
could be much larger than the regret contributions. We therefore quantify the expected
regret directly. In particular, we decompose the expected regret into a finite sum (of
regret contributions from walks of length up to
√
log (np(n)) or the square root of the
logarithm of the average degree) and a tail term. We obtain upper bounds on both the
finite sum and the tail term. Then we provide a matching lower bound on the expected
regret and prove the bound is tight.
5.2.2 Deriving Upper Bounds on Expected Regrets
Despite the above observations, the value of network effect and the expected regret
expressions are still very complicated. In particular, the kth term in equation (5.2) and
equation (5.5) are expectations of the ratio of two random variables (number of walks
of length k and the spectral norm of the multigraph (G(n)+G(n)T ) raised to the power
k). To overcome this difficulty, we first obtain asymptotic properties for the spectral
norm.
Then we count the expected number of walks of any length k in multigraph (G(n) +
G(n)T ) to quantify the profit contribution from walks of length k. To prove Theorem
5.4, we also need to obtain the expected difference in the number of walks of length k
in multigraph (G(n) +G(n)T ) and 2k times the number of walks of length k in network
G(n) to quantify the regret contribution from walks of length k. We present the results
of these two parts in the following.
1) Asymptotic Spectral Norm of the Multigraph (G(n) +G(n)T )
The asymptotic spectral norm of (G(n) + G(n)T ) can be derived from the spectral
property of undirected Erdös-Renyi networks. For undirected Erdös-Renyi networks,
Krivelevich and Sudakov (2003) show that the largest eigenvalues are highly concen-
trated. Moreover, the largest eigenvalue demonstrates phase transitions for different
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ranges of p(n). Specifically, Krivelevich and Sudakov (2003) show the following theo-
rem and two following corollaries. In the following, we say a sequence of events En hold
asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.) if the probabilities of En converge to 1.
Theorem 5.5 (Krivelevich and Sudakov 2003). Let G(n) be an undirected Erdös-Renyi
network. If ∆ is the maximum degree of G(n), then almost surely the largest eigenvalue
of the adjacency matrix of G(n) satisfies ‖G(n)‖ = (1 + o(1)) max{
√
∆, np(n)}, where
the o(1) term tends to zero as max{
√
∆, np(n)} tends to infinity.
Therefore, for large undirected Erdös-Renyi networks, the spectral norm is almost
surely of the same order as the maximum between the square root of the largest degree
and the average degree. While ∆ is a random variable given that G(n) is a random
network, one can use convergence results on ∆ to obtain the asymptotic property for
‖G(n)‖. The following corollary provided in Krivelevich and Sudakov (2003) is a result
about the convergence of the largest degree ∆ when p = Θ(n−1).
Corollary 5.1 (Krivelevich and Sudakov 2003). Let G(n) be an undirected Erdös-Renyi




Krivelevich and Sudakov (2003) omit the technical details of the proof of the Corol-
lary 5.1. The proof uses the fact that when p(n) = Θ(n−1), the binomial degree distribu-
tion of a node can be approximated by a Poisson degree distribution. Then the largest
degree ∆ is determined by the maximum of a set of i.i.d. Poisson random variables,
which converges to lognlog logn as shown in Kimber (1983).
The following corollary shows that when p(n) grows larger, the average degree dom-
inates the square root of the largest degree, and the spectral norm is of the same order
as the average degree.
Corollary 5.2 (Krivelevich and Sudakov 2003). Let G(n) be an undirected Erdös-Renyi
network. When p(n) ≥
√
logn
n , almost surely ‖G(n)‖ = (1 + o(1))np(n).
Krivelevich and Sudakov (2003) did not provide the spectral norm of G(n) for very
sparse networks. In the following, we derive a bound on the spectral norm for this set-




for some ε > 0 The following lemma
shows that in this case, the spectral norm is asymptotically almost surely bounded by
some constant.
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for some ε > 0 and p(n) = ω(n−2), asymptotically almost surely 1 ≤ ‖G(n)‖ ≤ m(ε),
where m(ε) is a constant that only depends on ε.




for some ε > 0 and p(n) = ω(n−2), the spectral norm does not grow in the size of the
networks. This is different from the spectral property of denser networks (for example,
the networks specified in Corollaries 5.1 and 5.2), where the spectral norms grow in the
size of the networks.
Now we have the rate at which the spectral norm of the undirected Erdös-Renyi net-
works grows for different network densities. Remember that (G(n) +G(n)T ) represents
an undirected network. However, the elements in the matrix (G(n) + G(n)T ) can take
values from {0, 1, 2} and it is not a binary network. Therefore we still need some extra
efforts to obtain the bound we need.
To establish the relation between the spectral norm of G(n) and (G(n) + G(n)T ),
we decompose the directed Erdös-Renyi network adjacency matrix G(n) into the sum
of an upper triangle matrix G1(n) and a lower triangle matrix G2(n), i.e. G(n) =
G1(n) + G2(n). Then (G1(n) + G1(n)
T ) and (G2(n) + G2(n)
T ) are two independent
undirected Erdös-Renyi networks with probability p(n), and (G(n) + G(n)T ) can be
viewed as the sum of two independent undirected Erdös-Renyi networks with probability
p(n). By the property of spectral norm, we have
‖G(n) +G(n)T ‖ ≤ ‖G1(n) +G1(n)T ‖+ ‖G2(n) +G2(n)T ‖.
Since (G1(n) +G1(n)
T ) is a non-negative matrix, by Perron-Frobenius Theorem, there
is a non-negative eigenvector associated with its largest eigenvalue. Using the property
of the largest eigenvalue, we can show that
‖G1(n) +G1(n)T ‖ ≤ ‖G(n) +G(n)T ‖.





∆, np(n)}] almost surely, where ∆ is the maximum degree of an undi-
rected Erdös-Renyi network with influence probability p(n). Thus, asymptotically
‖G(n) +G(n)T ‖ is of the same order of the largest eigenvalue of the undirected Erdös-
Renyi networks with the same probability p(n).
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Now we derive an alternative lower bound of ‖G(n) + G(n)T ‖ to obtain a sharper





. We use |E(G(n) +G(n)T )|
to denote the number of edges in multigraph (G(n)+G(n)T ). When p(n) = ω(n−2), the
number of edges in (G1(n) +G1(n)
T ) (or (G2(n) +G2(n)
T )) is (1 + o(1))n
2p(n)
2 almost
surely (Krivelevich and Sudakov 2003), therefore |E(G(n) +G(n)T )| = (2 + o(1))n
2p(n)
2
almost surely. Also since
‖G(n)+G(n)T ‖ = max
ξ
ξT (G(n) +G(n)T )ξ
ξT ξ
≥ 1







‖G(n) +G(n)T ‖ ≥ (2 + o(1))np(n).
To summarize, although ‖G(n)+G(n)T ‖ is a random variable, we have the following
asymptotic characterization of ‖G(n) +G(n)T ‖ for different ranges of values of p(n):
‖G(n)+G(n)T ‖ =











, if p(n) = Θ(n−1)






2) Expected Number of Walks of Different Lengths
We now quantify the expected number of walks of length k in (G(n) +G(n)T ). We
start with the case k = 2. We have the following lemma.









= 2n(n− 1)p(n)(1− 3p(n) + 2np(n)).
Note that Lemma 5.2 provides an exact calculation of the expected number of walks
of length 2 in the multigraph (G(n) + G(n)T ). The proof of Lemma 5.2 is based on
considering the degree distribution of a neighboring node and is given in Appendix A.3.
For walks with longer lengths, i.e., k ≥ 3, it is difficult to consider all possible repeated
links and thus an exact calculation of walks is difficult. However, we observe that the
number of walks of length k in the multigraph (G(n) + G(n)T ) can be upper bounded
by the product of the number of walks of length t for any 0 ≤ t ≤ k and the spectral
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norm of (G(n) +G(n)T ) raised to the power k − t. The result is given in the following
lemma.











Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3 help obtain an upper bound on the expected number of walks
of any length k asymptotically in the multigraph (G(n) +G(n)T ), because the spectral
norm converges asymptotically almost surely according to equation (5.6). This bound
helps us obtain a bound on the profit contribution from walks of different lengths and in
turn the value of network effect in very sparse networks (in Theorem 5.2) and the total
profit contribution from all walks of length greater than 1 in critically sparse networks
(in Theorem 5.3).
For denser networks, the profit contribution from walks of length greater than 1 is
significant and the value of network effect is large. Therefore, we need to quantify the
regret contribution from walks of different lengths. To quantify the regret contribution
from walks of different lengths, we need the expected difference in the number of walks
of length k in the multigraph (G(n) + G(n)T ) and 2k times the number of walks of
length k in network G(n). Unfortunately, an exact computation of the number of walks
of any given length is difficult. However, we can provide a lower bound for the expected
number of walks of different lengths in a directed Erdös-Renyi network G(n) by ignoring
the possibly repeated links. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4. For directed Erdös-Renyi network G(n), for any integer k ≥ 2,
EG(1
TG(n)k1) ≥ n2(n− 1)k−2(n− 2)p(n)k.
The following proposition provides bounds on the differences between the expected













Proposition 5.1. For any directed Erdös-Renyi network G(n), the following statements
hold.




























≤(k − 1)2k−1P (n, k)p(n)k−1 + (k − 1)k2kP (n, k − 1)p(n)k−2,
where P (n, k) = n!(n−k)! represents the number of ways of permuting k out of n objects.
The proof of Proposition 5.1 is quite involved. In the proof, we develop novel count-
ing techniques using the concepts of graph motifs. We refer the readers to Appendix
A.3 for the detailed proof. We note that Proposition 5.1 (i) only holds in expectation.




1 < 2k1TGk1. An example of such G is
G =

0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0

.
In this case, 1T (G+GT )31 = 134 and 231TG31 = 136, and therefore 1T (G+GT )k1 <
2k1TGk1. Also, in Proposition 5.1 (ii), we only bound the expected difference in the
number of walks of length k in multigraph (G(n) + G(n)T ) and 2k times the number
of walks of length k in network G(n) for k ≤ n + 1 − 1p(n) . For dense networks and
larger k, we use a concentration inequality on the in/out degree of the consumers in the
network to obtain a bound on the tail profit contribution. In particular, we show that





, the in/out degree
of every node is highly concentrated around the average degree. We have the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.2. Let c(n) be a function of n such that limn→∞ c(n) = +∞ and






c(n) < δ(n) < 1. If p(n) =
c(n) logn
n , then almost surely every node of the directed
Erdös-Renyi network G(n) has in/out degree in the range of [(1 − δ(n))c(n) log n, (1 +
δ(n))c(n) log n].
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5.2.3 Deriving Lower Bounds on Expected Regrets and Expected Frac-
tional Regrets
With the above results, we are able to obtain upper bounds on the regrets needed for
Theorems 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. To obtain matching lower bounds, we use different methods
for sparse and dense networks. For very sparse and critically sparse networks in the
range in Theorems 5.2 and 5.3, matching lower bounds of the regret can be obtained by
counting the expected number of components in the network that consist of two nodes
with exactly one directed link (see Appendix A.2 for details). For denser networks in
the range in Theorem 5.4, a lower bound on the expected regret can be obtained by the
regret contribution from walks of length 2. We refer the detailed analysis of this part
to Appendix A.4.
Finally, in order to obtain bounds on the expected fractional regret, we also need to







































ing the lower and upper bounds of the optimal profit, we have
π∗(n) = Θ(n). (5.7)
The results on the fractional regret are thus established.
Chapter 6
Value of Price Discrimination for
Random Networks with General
Degree Distributions
In this chapter, we extend our analysis to more general random networks. We first
establish a result to obtain upper bounds on the value of price discrimination in general
networks. Then we apply the result to obtain upper bounds on the value of price
discrimination for power-law networks.
The following theorem provides a general framework to obtain an upper bound on
the expected regret and expected fractional regret in random networks with general
degree distributions. The proof is provided in Appendix A.5.
Theorem 6.1. For any sequence of directed, integer-valued random networks G(n), if
(G(n) +G(n)T ) has degree distribution d(n) ∼ F (n) and the network satisfies:
1. max1≤i≤n
∑n
j=1 (G(n)ij +G(n)ji) ≥ ξ(n) asymptotically almost surely for some
sequence ξ(n);
2. E[d(n)2] ≤ γ(n) for some sequence γ(n);





, and the expected fractional regret








Theorem 6.1 provides a general framework to evaluate the value of price discrimi-
nation in random networks by using the asymptotic behavior of the ratio of the second
moment of the degree distribution and the maximum degree. Thus, if we can obtain a
lower bound on the maximum degree of (G(n) + G(n)T ) and an upper bound on the
second moment of the degree distribution of (G(n) + G(n)T ), then we can obtain an
upper bound on the expected regret and expected fractional regret.
In the following, we apply Theorem 6.1 to obtain bounds on the regret and fractional
regret for an important class of random networks — the power-law networks. The
power-law networks, also called the scale-free networks, is a class of networks whose
degree distribution follows a power-law. For comprehensive discussions of the power-
law networks, we refer the readers to Aiello et al. (2001).
We consider the continuous version of the power-law distributions with p.d.f. f(x) ∝
x−α and c.d.f. F (x) such that 1− F (x) ∝ x1−α, where α is called the exponent of the
power-law distribution. The exponent α of the power-law distribution has a significant
impact on the properties of the distribution. We are interested in the range α > 2
because the expected degree diverges for α ≤ 2. The range of α of interest also covers the
α = 3 case obtained from preferential attachment process originally shown in Barabási
and Albert (1999). Power-law networks also demonstrate a structural cutoff because the
maximum degree in a finite network is not unbounded. In Newman (2003), the authors
show that for networks of size n with power-law distributions following pd ∼ d−α, the
expected maximum degree (or the structural cutoff) follows dmax ∼ n
1
α−1 , which is of
order o(n) given that α > 2. We use a more conservative cutoff and impose an upper
bound n for the support of the degree distribution. This upper bound on the degree
is always satisfied for binary networks because the in/out degree of any node in G(n)
is at most n. To obtain a valid probability distribution, we further impose a lower
bound xmin ≥ 1 on the support of the distribution. A lower bound on the support
is also commonly used in power-law degree distributions to obtain valid distributions.
In the preferential attachment process, the number of edges for every newborn node
provides the lower bound on the degree (Barabási and Albert 1999). With the above













for xmin ≤ x ≤ n, (6.1)
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and the c.d.f. of the distribution follows












for xmin ≤ x ≤ n.
(6.2)
When we consider a sequence of power-law distributions in terms of n, we use F (n)
to denote the sequence of c.d.f. of the distributions. In the following, we consider
random networks G(n) whose in-degrees a1, ..., an are i.i.d. with distribution F (n),
and out-degrees b1, ..., bn are also i.i.d. with distribution F (n). We allow pairwise
correlation between the in-degree and out-degree of a node, i.e. corr(ai, bi) = ρa,b




j=1 bj . In
Section 7.1.2, we will provide a generative process for sampling valid in-degrees and
out-degrees. Particularly, we can build upon the configuration model (Molloy and Reed
1995, Newman et al. 2001, Chung and Lu 2002) to construct such directed random
networks with power-law degree distributions.
The following Theorem 6.2 gives an upper bound on the asymptotic value of price
discrimination for such random networks with power-law degree distributions.
Theorem 6.2. For any exponent α > 2, consider the sequence of power-law distri-
butions with c.d.f. F (n). For the sequence of random networks G(n) with in- and
out-degrees i.i.d. with distribution F (n) and any degree correlation ρa,b ∈ [−1, 1], the
expected regret EG[R(p0)] = o(n), and the expected fractional regret EG[RF (p0)] = o(1).
















, if α > 3,
1 While we do not restrict the possible values of ρa,b, the correlation between in-degree and out-
degree in such networks are usually much higher than −1 because of the highly asymmetric nature of
the degree distribution and the fact that the sum of in-degrees of all nodes and the sum of out-degrees
of all nodes are equal to the number of links in the network.
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, if α > 3,
for any ε > 0.
Theorem 6.2 shows that, for random networks with power-law degree distributions,
the expected regret grows sub-linearly in n, and the expected fractional regret vanishes
asymptotically. This yields the same conclusion as in Theorem 5.1 for Erdös-Renyi net-
works, suggesting that the value of price discrimination is small for a broader class of
random networks. Furthermore, the expected fractional regret decays at least polyno-
mially in the size of the network. We also point out that, the degree correlation ρa,b does
not affect the rate of decay of the expected regret or the expected fractional regret; how-
ever, as we will see in the numerical experiments in Section 7.1.2, the degree correlation
ρa,b does play a role in determining the magnitude of the value of price discrimination.
We now provide a proof sketch for Theorem 6.2. To apply Theorem 6.1, we need
to obtain a bound on the second moment of the degree distribution in multigraph
(G(n) + G(n)T ), and a lower bound on the maximum degree of (G(n) + G(n)T ). In
particular, the degree of node i in (G(n) + G(n)T ) is the sum of the in-degree ai and
out-degree bi for node i. Thus, we can calculate the second moment of the degree
distribution based on the p.d.f. of the power-law distribution in equation (6.1) and the
specified degree correlation ρa,b. Different values of α lead to different (exact) orders of
the second moment in terms of n. To find the lower bound of the maximum degree in
the multigraph (G(n)+G(n)T ), we first obtain a bound on the maximum in-degree/out-
degree in network G(n), which is also a natural lower bound for the maximum degree in
multigraph (G(n)+G(n)T ). We then show that with high probability, the maximum in-
degree or out-degree is lower bounded by xminn
1−δ
α−1 , for any small enough δ > 0. This
result is consistent with the structural cutoff result in Newman (2003) that provides
the expected maximum degree in power-law networks. Finally, the (exact) rate of the
second moment and the lower bound of the in-/out-degree jointly determine the upper
bounds we obtain in Theorem 6.2. The detailed proof of Theorem 6.2 is provided in
Appendix A.5.
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To conclude this chapter, we provide an example of a sequence of random networks
G(n) where the expected regret EG[R(p0)] 6= o(n), and the expected fractional regret
EG[RF (p0)] 6= o(1). We consider a sequence of directed, binary star networks G(n) with
growing size n. In the nth network, one of the n consumers is randomly picked as the
sink, and the remaining n − 1 consumers are the sources. In other words, exactly one
random consumer is being influenced by everyone else in network G(n). The optimal
pricing strategy should charge the sink consumer the highest price, and charge everyone
else in the network the same (lower) price. It can be verified that for G(n), the spectral
norm ‖G(n) +G(n)T ‖ =
√
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1−ρ2 (n + 2ρ
√
n− 1) = Θ(n), and the




In this chapter, we conduct numerical experiments to validate our theoretical results.
Our numerical experiments consist of four parts. In the first part, we show how the
value of price discrimination changes as the network size n increases, under different
network densities in Erdös-Renyi networks, and under different exponents and degree
correlations in power-law networks. In the second part, we show how p(n) affects the
value of price discrimination, under a given network size n, in Erdös-Renyi networks.
In the third part, we test a variant of our model to demonstrate the robustness of our
results. Finally, we investigate the value of price discrimination on some real-world
networks.
7.1 Impact of Network Size on the Value of Price Discrim-
ination
In our first set of experiments, we investigate the impact of network size on the value
of price discrimination, for both Erdös-Renyi networks and power-law networks.
7.1.1 Erdös-Renyi Networks
For Erdös-Renyi networks, we numerically study the decreasing rates of average frac-
tional regret for different p(n) as n increases. We consider ρ ∈ {0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9}.
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For each n ∈ {500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 10000, 20000, 50000, 100000}, we randomly gen-





n }. For each realization of G(n, p(n)), we compute the corresponding
fractional regret according to equation (3.6). We take average of the fractional regrets
under the same combination of n and p(n) and obtain the average fractional regret
RF (p0) corresponding to that combination.
Figure 7.1: Log-log plot of average fractional regrets under uniform pricing across dif-
ferent n in Erdös-Renyi networks.
To better compare the decreasing rates of the average fractional regret for different
p(n), we present the simulation results as scatter plots in log-log scale in Figure 7.1.
The scatter plots for different values of p(n) appear to follow straight lines in the log-
log scale for the values of n of our choice, but they are not straight lines essentially.
For comparison, we add lines that are the best-fit regression lines in the log-log scale.
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The slopes of lines in the log-log scale plot reflect the decreasing rates under different
circumstances. From Figure 7.1, we know that all lines have negative slopes. This
implies that in general, the average fractional regret decays as n increases, with different
decay rates for different ranges of p(n). This is consistent with our result in Theorem
5.1. In particular, the results show that when p(n) is relatively small or relatively large,
the slope is steeper and the decreasing rate is faster. When p(n) is moderately large, the
slope is flatter and the decay rate is slower. This is consistent with results in Chapter
5. As ρ increases, the value of price discrimination increases uniformly across various
p(n). However, we can see from Figure 7.1 that, the decay rates for different p(n) are
roughly the same under different values of ρ. This implies that the decay rates of the
expected fractional regret does not depend on the choices of ρ.
7.1.2 Power-Law Networks
For random networks with power-law degree distributions, we numerically study the
decreasing rates of the average fractional regret for different power-law exponents and
different pairwise correlations between the in-degree and out-degree of nodes as n in-
creases.
We first provide an approach to construct a valid correlated in-degree sequence
a1, ..., an and out-degree sequence b1, ..., bn. We first sample i.i.d. in-degrees a1, ..., an
from the power-law distribution F . Without loss of generality, we assume the sequence
a1, ..., an is sorted in descending order. Next, we sample i.i.d. random variables Z1, ..., Zn
as follows: For each i, Zi = 1 with probability |θ| and Zi = 0 with probability 1 − |θ|,
where θ ∈ [−1, 1] is a parameter we use to control the correlation between in-degrees
and out-degrees (it is not necessarily the correlation ρa,b between the in- and out-degree
sequence). We define sets of nodes I0 = {i : Zi = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, and I1 = {i : Zi =
1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. The out-degrees b1, ..., bn are constructed by a permutation of a1, ..., an
as follows. If θ ≥ 0, then we set bi = ai for i ∈ I1, and set {bi : i ∈ I0} by a random
permutation of {ai : i ∈ I0}. If θ < 0, then we set bi = an−i+1 and set {bi : i ∈ I1} by
a random permutation of {an−i+1 : i ∈ I1}. By this construction, both the in-degrees
and the out-degrees follow the power-law distribution F and their sum of in-degrees and
out-degrees are equal. When θ > 0, the in- and out-degree sequences have a positive
correlation; when θ < 0, the two degree sequences have a negative correlation.
45
Moreover, when θ ≥ 0, the correlation between in-degree and out-degree is θ +
O(n−1).1 So asymptotically the correlation is ρa,b = θ. This is because when
n is large (as in our simulation), an approximately equivalent representation of bi is
bi = Ziai + (1 − Zi)X, where X follows the same power-law distribution F and is
independent of ai. We can then verify that Var(bi) = Var(ai) and Cov(ai, bi) =
θVar(ai). Therefore, for large networks, asymptotically corr(ai, bi) = θ for any i and
ρa,b = θ.
We now describe the details of our numerical experiments. We set xmin = 2 and
ρ = 0.8 for all cases. For each α ∈ {2.5, 2.75, 3.0, 3.25, 3.5}, we generate a sequence
of networks with different sizes n according to the power-law distribution specified in
equation (6.1) and (6.2). For each α and n, we generate the in-degree sequence and out-
degree sequence with different values of the parameter θ ∈ {−1,−0.5, 0, 0.5, 1} according
to the approach described earlier in this section. For the in- and out-degree sequences
associated with each θ, we use configuration model (Molloy and Reed 1995, Newman
et al. 2001) to construct the directed random network G(n, α, θ) with the specified
degrees, and compute the corresponding fractional regret according to equation (3.6).
For each combination of parameters, we repeat the above process for N = 100 times
independently, and compute the average fractional regret RF (p0).
We present our results as scatter plots in the log-log scale, as shown in Figure 7.2.
We add the best-fit regression lines to better illustrate the decreasing trends of the
fractional regret. We also list the average sample Pearson correlation between the in-
and out-degree sequence (denoted as r̄a,b) corresponding to each θ. We observe that, for
the simulated power-law networks, the average fractional regret decreases as the network
size n increases. This observation is consistent with our theoretical results about the
value of price discrimination on power-law networks in Theorem 6.2. Moreover, we
observe that the slopes of the regression lines in Figure 7.2 are quite steep (as compared
to the cases where p(n) = 1n in Figure 7.1), and thus the decreasing rates of the average
fractional regret in these power-law networks are relatively fast. This observation is
again consistent with our theoretical results in Theorem 6.2, as we show that the rates
of decreasing for power-law networks are at least as fast as polynomial decay.
1 Since there is a small probability 1|I0| (which in expectation is
1
n(1−θ) ) that bi = ai for any i ∈ I0,
therefore bi and ai have a small correlation, which vanishes as n→∞.
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Figure 7.2: Log-log plot of average fractional regrets under uniform pricing across dif-
ferent n in power-law networks.
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Moreover, we observe that the average fractional regret generally increases as we
decrease θ from 1 to 0, and further decreasing θ from 0 to −1 does not have much
impact on the magnitude of the average fractional regret. On one hand, this observation
suggests that a higher positive correlation leads to a smaller value of price discrimination.
This can be explained by the level of imbalance in the network. As we increase the
degree correlation to a higher positive value, the incoming and outgoing influence of
each consumer in the network become more balanced, leading to a smaller value of price
discrimination. On the other hand, when the correlation is zero or negative, the network
is very unbalanced and thus demonstrates a relatively high value of price discrimination.
When θ ≤ 0, the value of price discrimination remains similar across different values of
θ. We point out that θ is not equivalent to the degree correlation ρa,b when θ < 0. Since
the degrees of nodes are discrete and the degree distribution is highly asymmetric, a
big mass of nodes would have in- or out-degrees concentrated around the lower bound
of the support of the power-law distribution. Thus it is actually difficult to create
power-law networks with significantly anti-correlated in- and out-degrees. Therefore,
networks with different non-positive values of θ yield to similar degree sequences and
hence similar value of price discrimination. We find that, even choosing θ = −1 leads
to an average sample correlation r̄a,b = −0.09. Therefore, the results corresponding to
negative θ almost coincide with the results corresponding to θ = 0.
7.2 Impact of Network Densities on the Value of Price
Discrimination
In our second set of experiments, we consider the case when the underlying networks are
directed Erdös-Renyi networks with size n = 100, 000. In our numerical experiments,
we choose ρ ∈ {0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9}. For each ρ, we consider different influence probabili-













n }. Then for each p(n), we randomly
generate N = 100 independent directed Erdös-Renyi networks with 100, 000 nodes. For
each realization of G(n, p(n)), we compute the corresponding fractional regret according
to equation (3.6).
The values of fractional regrets are presented in the form of boxplots in Figure
7.3. We can see that for each ρ, the values of fractional regret first increase and then
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Figure 7.3: Box-plot of fractional regrets under uniform pricing in Erdös-Renyi networks
(n = 100, 000).
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decrease as p(n) increases. The peak is reached when p(n) = log lognn . When p(n) is
very small (p(n) = 1
n1.3
) or very large (p(n) = (logn)
2
n ), the fractional regret is less than
5%. In addition, as the value of ρ increases, the value of price discrimination increases
uniformly across all values of p(n). This implies that, larger ρ leads to larger value of
price discrimination under the same n and p(n).
Recall that in Theorems 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4, our theoretical bounds of expected frac-
tional regret under different ranges of p(n) also yield similar trends for a fixed network
size: when the network density is relatively small or relatively large, the expected frac-
tion regret decreases very fast and has a small value of price discrimination for large n;
when the network density is moderately large, the expected fractional regret decreases
slowly such that for decently large network size n, the value of price discrimination is
non-negligible.
7.3 The Value of Price Discrimination with Degree Nor-
malization
Next, we investigate the robustness of our results. We perform similar analysis as in
Section 7.1 and Section 7.2, but with a variant of our model. In particular, instead
of normalizing a consumer’s local network effect by the spectral norm of (G + GT ),
we normalize it by the total amount of influence (or the total in-degree of G) received
by the consumer. Specifically, we consider the setting in which the preferences of the
consumers are represented by the following utility function:






For any i, if
∑
j 6=iGij = 0 then Gij = 0 for all j 6= i, and we consider 0/0 to be 0.
This utility function implies that, the more total influence consumer i receives, the less
important his/her single neighbor’s purchasing decision would be to him/her. In this
setting, the normalization factor could be different for different consumers.
In the simulation, we study the impact of network sizes and network densities on
the value of price discrimination under this model variant for Erdös-Renyi networks.
The simulation process to study the impact of network sizes (network densities, resp.)
is exactly the same as that described in Section 7.1.1 (Section 7.2, resp.), except that
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we modify the normalization factor of each node as the total number of in-degrees of
the node. The simulation results are presented in Figure 7.4. As we can see from Figure
7.4, the observed patterns/trends in this model variant are similar to our results in the
base model. Particularly, the average fractional regret still decreases as we increase the
network size n, and the decay rates for different p(n) are different. For a given network
size, the values of fractional regret also firstly increase and then decrease, as we increase
the network density. The peak is reached when the network density is moderately large.
This set of simulation results suggests that our results may be applicable to a larger set
of models, and the theoretical results we obtained are robust with respect to this model
variant.
Figure 7.4: Fractional regrets under uniform pricing in Erdös-Renyi networks with
degree normalization.
(a) Regret for different n and p(n) in log-log scale (b) Regrets for different p(n) (n = 100, 000)
7.4 The Value of Price Discrimination on Real Networks
We select five social network datasets, namely ‘Epinions1’, ‘LiveJournal1’, ‘Slashdot0811’,
‘Slashdot0902’, and ‘Pokec’, from Stanford Large Network Dataset Collection (Leskovec
and Krevl 2014), and use the converted version of the data from The University of
Florida sparse matrix collection (Davis and Hu 2011). All the selected datasets are
directed binary social networks. A brief description of each network is summarized in
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Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Brief descriptions of selected real-world networks.
Name of Networks Description
Epinions1 A who-trust-whom online social network of a a general con-
sumer review site Epinions.com. Members of the site can decide
whether to “trust” each other. All the trust relationships inter-
act and form the Web of Trust which is then combined with re-
view ratings to determine which reviews are shown to the users.
(Richardson et al. 2003)
LiveJournal1 LiveJournal is a free on-line community with almost 10 mil-
lion members, allowing members to maintain journals, individ-
ual and group blogs, and declare which other members are their
friends. (Backstrom et al. 2006, Leskovec et al. 2009)
Slashdot0811 Slashdot is a technology-related news website known for its spe-
cific user community with a feature allowing users to tag each
other as friends or foes. The network contains friend/foe links
between the users. The links don’t distinguish friend or foe
relationship, so the network is binary and non-negative. The
network was obtained in November 2008. (Leskovec et al. 2009)
Slashdot0902 Same as ‘Slashdot0811’. The network was obtained in February
2009. (Leskovec et al. 2009)
Pokec Pokec is the most popular online social network in Slovakia. The
popularity of network has not changed even after the coming of
Facebook. The network contains oriented user friendship data.
(Takac and Zabovsky 2012)
For each dataset, we extract the adjacency matrix G and calculate the corresponding
fractional regret according to equation (3.6) with given value of ρ. The basic statistics
of the selected social networks and the fractional regrets under different values of ρ
are summarized in Table 7.2. The degree correlation coefficient is the sample Pearson
correlation coefficient of the in-degree and out-degree of the network. The level of
symmetry is defined as the ratio between the number of links whose reverse is also in
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the network and the total number of links in the network.
Table 7.2: Results from real-world data.
Name of Networks Epinions1 LiveJournal1 Slashdot0811 Slashdot0902 Pokec
Number of Nodes 75,888 4,847,571 77,360 82,168 1,632,803
Average In/Out Degree 6.7051 14.2326 11.7046 11.5430 18.7546
Degree Correlation Coefficient 0.5491 0.6490 0.9547 0.9343 0.7150
Level of Symmetry 41% 75% 87% 84% 54%
Fractional Regret (ρ = 0.9) 0.1627 0.0048 0.0265 0.0417 0.0423
Fractional Regret (ρ = 0.8) 0.0611 0.0029 0.0088 0.0131 0.0190
Fractional Regret (ρ = 0.7) 0.0289 0.0019 0.0040 0.0058 0.0109
Fractional Regret (ρ = 0.6) 0.0150 0.0012 0.0021 0.0030 0.0066
The results are presented in Table 7.2. In Table 7.2, we can see that the value of price
discrimination is very small for the largest network ‘LiveJournal’, with the fractional
regret of uniform pricing being less than 1% for all values of ρ. For the other networks
with medium size, the value of price discrimination is generally small. However, it could
already be significant in certain contexts, especially when ρ is closer to 1. Moreover, we
note that in Table 7.2, for the networks of similar sizes (‘Epinions1’, ‘Slashdot0811’ and
‘Slashdot0902’), usually the higher the level of symmetry of the network is, the smaller
the fractional regret is. Overall, although these real-world networks do not necessarily
follow the theoretical models we investigate, the results can provide part support for
our main results.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we study the asymptotic value of price discrimination in large random
social networks. We find that, for Erdös-Renyi random networks, the value of price
discrimination is not a positive fraction of the profit asymptotically for all network
densities. Yet, when the average degree of the network stays as a constant or grows
slower than the logarithm of the size of the network, the rate of expected fractional
regret decays slowly and therefore, for decently large networks there could still be non-
negligible value of price discrimination. The results for very sparse networks (average
degree decreasing in the size of the network) are driven by the fact that the network
is fragmented enough for the influence of any individual to be small, while for dense
networks (average degree increasing at least as the logarithm of the size of the network)
the results are driven by relatively equal positions of individuals in the network.
We also extend our analysis to random networks with general degree distributions.
We propose a general framework based on degree information to provide bounds for
the expected value of price discrimination in random networks. We apply the general
framework to random networks with power-law degree distributions, and show that the
value of price discrimination (in terms of expected fractional regret) vanishes as the size
of the network increases, for any exponent α > 2.
Given our results, it would appear that the firms need to be more careful about using
price discrimination, because the value of such discriminative pricing policies under
many cases may not be substantial, while the inequity and the lack of transparency in
pricing can lead to lower consumer satisfaction and mistrust. Moreover, our analysis
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and results can serve as a first step in addressing the value of other marketing strategies
on social networks, such as product promotions or referral programs.
Our analysis is purely structural and ignores the heterogeneity in consumer prefer-
ences. While consumer preferences play a role in generating value from price discrimina-
tion, the interaction between heterogeneous consumer preferences and network structure
and its role in generating value from price discrimination is an important direction of fu-
ture work. Another possible future direction of work could focus on the moderate-sized
networks where there may be some value of price discrimination. Network information
is often noisy and using optimal pricing assuming perfect network information may be
sub-optimal. The design of robust pricing policies under noisy network information can
also be a future research direction.
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Appendix A
Proofs
In the following, we suppress the indexes and represent G(n, p(n)) or G(n) as G and
p(n) as p for simplicity.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. By definition, G is a price discrimination free network if and only if for any





























































1 = 1TGk1. (A.1)
Conversely, if equation (A.1) holds for all positive integer k, then we can immediately
tell that R(p0) = 0 for any ρ, and G is a price discrimination free network.
Now we show that (A.1) is equivalent to Gk1 = (GT )k1 for all k. Note that equation
(A.1) always holds for k = 1. When k = 2, expanding both sides of the equation yields
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1 for all positive integer k. Thus we finish the proof of the theorem.
A.2 A General Lower Bound on the Expected Regret
In this section, we provide a general lower bound for the expected regret EG[R(p0)] by
decomposing the network into components, and considering only components with size
2.

























If the network G is not connected, we can decompose the network G into compo-
nents,1 and by reorganizing the orders of nodes in the matrix representation, we obtain
a new adjacency matrix G that is a block diagonal matrix.2 In particular, we assume











1 The network G is a directed network. Here we consider the component as a subgraph of G such
that any two vertices in the subgraph are connected to each other by paths if we ignore the directions
of the network.
2 We call it G again since the two adjacency matrices are equivalent.
62
where Gi, i = 1, 2, ..., L represents the adjacency matrix of each component, and L is








































































represents the adjacency matrix of a component with 2 nodes and 1 link, and there are l
number of such components in the network G. Then only considering such components



























































‖G+GT ‖ (‖G+GT ‖ − ρ)
.
The expected number of components with adjacency matrix Gsub in the Erdös-Renyi




















A.3 Proofs of Structural Properties of Erdös-Renyi Net-
works
A.3.1 Proof of Lemma 5.1




for some ε > 0 and p = ω(n−2), we must have 0 < ε < 1.













for some m > 1 (not necessary
an integer) and p = ω(n−2).
In random graph theory, for a given property M , threshold function t(n) is defined
as a function that satisfies




P (G has the property M)→ 1, if p
t(n)
→∞.
From Corollary 1 of Erdos and Rényi (1960), when m is an integer, t(n) = n−
m+2
m+1
is a threshold function for the emergence of a tree with m+ 2 nodes in the network G.
Thus when p = o(n−
m+2
m+1 ) for some integer m,
lim
n→∞








P (G has at least one star with equal to or more than m+ 2 nodes) = 0.
64






for some m > 1, we know that p = o(n
− bm+2cbm+1c ), where bxc
represents the largest integer that is less than or equal to x. Therefore,
lim
n→∞
P (∆ ≤ bm+ 2c) = 1.
Since p = ω(n−2) and t(n) = n−2 is a threshold function for the emergence of an
edge (Erdos and Rényi 1960), therefore,
lim
n→∞




P (∆ ≥ 1) = 1.
For any undirected network G,
√
∆ ≤ ‖G‖ ≤ ∆. Therefore when G is an undirected
Erdös-Renyi network with the specified network density, asymptotically almost surely
1 ≤ ‖G‖ ≤ bm+ 2c. Recall that m is some real number such that m > 1 and 1m ≤ ε, if
we define m(ε) = bm+ 2c, then we prove that asymptotically almost surely 1 ≤ ‖G‖ ≤
m(ε), where m(ε) is a constant that only depends on ε.
A.3.2 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Proof. If a network G (undirected) has degree distribution d ∼ P (d) and the expected
degree of a node is E(d), then the degree distribution of a neighboring node (a node
reached following an edge) is given by P̃ (d) = dP (d)E(d) (Newman et al. 2001). This is
because there are nE(d) end points among all the edges in the network, and there are
d stubs at every node of degree d. Following an edge, the edge chooses its end point
randomly, and the probability that it ends at a specific node of degree d is dnE(d) (for
large enough n). Since there are nP (d) nodes of degree d in the network, the probability
that, following an edge which randomly picks its end point, we reach a neighboring node
of degree d is nP (d) dnE(d) , or equivalently, P̃ (d). Therefore, the expected degree of the





In the multigraph (G + GT ), where G is a directed Erdös-Renyi network with
probability p, we can view the in/out-degree distribution as i.i.d. binomial distri-
bution d ∼ Bin(2(n − 1), p) as n grows large enough. Thus E(d) = 2(n − 1)p,
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Var(d) = 2(n− 1)p(1− p), Ẽ(d) = 1− 3p+ 2np, where d denotes the in/out-degree in
the multigraph (G+GT ).




where N+(v) is the set of out-going neighbors of v and deg+(u) is the out-degree of node






E(d)Ẽ(d). Since we choose v randomly, the expected number of walks of length 2 in









= nE(d)Ẽ(d) = 2n(n− 1)p(1− 3p+ 2np).
This finishes our proof.
A.3.3 Proof of Lemma 5.3
Proof. (G+GT ) is a symmetric matrix, and ‖
(
G+GT
)k ‖ = ‖G+GT ‖k for any integer
k > 0. By definition, the largest eigenvalue of a symmetric matrix B is defined as
‖B‖ = maxξ ξ
TBξ
ξT ξ




















)k−t ‖ = ‖G+GT ‖k−t.










Thus we finish the proof.
A.3.4 Proof of Lemma 5.4










Now we consider all possible combinations of {l(1), l(2), ..., l(k − 1)} that can result in
walks of length k in G. We can choose l(1) 6= i, l(2) 6= l(1), ..., l(k − 1) 6= l(k − 2)
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and l(k − 1) 6= j. Thus there are (n − 1)k−2(n − 2) choices. This gives EG((Gk)ij) ≥
(n − 1)k−2(n − 2)pk. Since there are n2 elements in the matrix G, EG(1TGk1) ≥
n2(n− 1)k−2(n− 2)pk.
A.3.5 Proof of Proposition 5.1
Proof. We first prove part (i). To characterize the difference, we first develop a method
to estimate the number of walks of length k in multigraph (G+GT ) and network G.
For each integer k ≥ 0 and integer 2 ≤ l ≤ min{k+ 1, n}, we define the set of motifs
inducing walks of length k with l distinct nodes. The set of such motifs is represented
as:
F lk ={(i0, i1, ..., ik) | i0, i1, ..., ik ∈ L, i0 = 0, i1 6= i0, i2 6= i1, ..., ik 6= ik−1,




{ih} = l − 1},
where L = {0, 1, ..., l − 1} is the set of dummy nodes. The set of all motifs inducing
walks of length k is
Fk = ∪2≤l≤min{k+1,n}F lk.
For any motif f ∈ Fk, l(f) denotes the number of nodes in the motif.
Any walk of length k in a directed multigraph is represented as w = (v0, e1, v1, ..., ek, vk),
where v0, v1, ..., vk are the nodes and e1, ..., ek are the links such that eh is a link between
the ordered pair of nodes (vh−1, vh).
In the network G, on one hand, for any walk w = (v0, e1, v1, ..., ek, vk), there ex-
ists a unique motif f = (i0, i1, ..., ik) ∈ Fk, and a unique injection function gw,f :
{0, 1, ..., l(f) − 1} → N that maps the indices of nodes in the motif to the actual set
of nodes, denoted as N . In particular, v0 = gw,f (i0), ..., vk = gw,f (ik) and the link
eh, 1 ≤ h ≤ k, is the unique link between the ordered pair of nodes (vh−1, vh). On
the other hand, given any motif f = (i0, i1, ..., ik) ∈ Fk and any injection function
gw,f : {0, 1, ..., l(f) − 1} → N , we can find a unique walk w = (v0, e1, v1, ..., ek, vk) of
length k in the network G, such that v0 = gw,f (i0), ..., vk = gw,f (ik) and the link eh,
1 ≤ h ≤ k, is the unique link between the ordered pair of nodes (vh−1, vh). For any
fi ∈ Fk, let hi(G) denote the number of possible walks associated to motif fi in the
network G. The above argument implies that hi(G) is equal to the number of such
injection functions.
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Similarly, in the multigraph (G+GT ), on one hand, for any walk w = (v0, e1, v1, ..., ek, vk),
there exists a unique motif f = (i0, i1, ..., ik) ∈ Fk, a unique injection function gw,f :
{0, 1, ..., l(f) − 1} → N , and a unique binary vector ew ∈ {0, 1}k, such that v0 =
gw,f (i0), ..., vk = gw,f (ik) and the link eh, 1 ≤ h ≤ k, is the unique link between the
ordered pair of nodes (vh−1, vh) in G if ew(h) = 1, and is the unique link between the
ordered pair of nodes (vh−1, vh) in G
T if ew(h) = 0. On the other hand, given any
motif f = (i0, i1, ..., ik) ∈ Fk, any injection function gw,f : {0, 1, ..., l(f) − 1} → N and
any binary vector ew ∈ {0, 1}k, we can find a unique walk w = (v0, e1, v1, ..., ek, vk) of
length k in the multigraph (G+GT ), such that v0 = gw,f (i0), ..., vk = gw,f (ik) and the
link eh, 1 ≤ h ≤ k, is the unique link between the ordered pair of nodes (vh−1, vh) in
G if ew(h) = 1, and is the unique link between the ordered pair of nodes (vh−1, vh) in
GT if ew(h) = 0. For any fi ∈ Fk, let hi(G+GT ) denote the number of possible walks
associated to motif fi in the multigraph (G + G
T ). The above argument implies that
hi(G+G
T ) is equal to 2k multiplied by the number of such injection functions.
Moreover, by definition we can see that for any motif fi ∈ Fk,
hi(G+G
T ) = 2khi(G).
In particular, if l ≤ n and fi ∈ F lk, then hi(G) = P (n, l), and hi(G + GT ) = 2kP (n, l).
Here, P (n, l) means the l−permutation of n, i.e. P (n, l) = n!(n−l)! .
In this way, we have established the relationship between motifs of walks of length k,
and the possible walks of length k in network G or multigraph (G+GT ). If we consider
all distinct motifs of walks of length k, and sum up the number of walks associated with
each motif, we obtain the count of walks of length k in the network.
Let mk denote the number of distinct motifs of walks of length k, i.e. mk = |Fk|.
Note that any motif of walks of length k contains at most k + 1 nodes. There is only
one motif that contains k + 1 nodes, i.e. the motif representing the paths of length k
(without repeated nodes), and all other motifs contain at most k nodes. The upper
bound of number of possible walks (without self-loops) build on k nodes starting from
a given node is (k − 1)k. This is also an upper bound of possible number of distinct
motifs with at most k nodes in the network. Therefore,
mk ≤ 1 + (k − 1)k.
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To count the number of walks, we define binary random variables representing the
existence of walks in the network G as follows,
Xij(G) =
1, if walk j associated to motif fi of walks in network G exists0, else,
with i = 1, ...,mk and j = 1, ..., hi(G). In particular, if fi is a motif consisting s distinct
ordered pairs of nodes, or equivalently, s distinct links, then
P (Xij(G) = 1) = p
s, (A.4)
for j = 1, 2, ..., hi(G).
Similarly, we define binary random variables representing the existence of walks in
the multigraph (G+GT ) as follows,
Xij(G+G
T ) =
1, if walk j associated to motif fi of walks in multigraph G+GT exists0, else,
with i = 1, ...,mk and j = 1, ..., hi(G + G
T ). In particular, if fi is a motif consisting s
distinct ordered pairs of nodes, or equivalently, s distinct links, then
P (Xij(G+G
T ) = 1) ≥ ps, (A.5)
for j = 1, 2, ..., hi(G + G
T ). This is because with probability p, a link and its reverse
appear simultaneously in the multigraph (G + GT ), i.e. the number of links between
the ordered pair of nodes (u, v) is equal to the number of links between the ordered pair
of nodes (v, u). This correlation of links increases the probability of the existence of a
given walk.
Now we can represent the number of walks of length k in the network through the
































































T ) = 1).
(A.7)
From equation (A.4), (A.5), (A.6) and (A.7), and the relationship that hi(G+G
T ) =














This is valid for any integer k ≥ 0. Therefore we finish the proof of part (i).
We illustrate our proof ideas with an example where k = 3 and n ≥ 4, and summarize
the results in Table A.1. For walks with small lengths, we are able to characterize the
exact expression of the expected number of walks of given length in the network G and
multigraph (G+GT ). The labels of nodes in the motifs represent the order of visiting
a node in the walk.
Now we prove part (ii). We decompose the set of all distinct motifs inducing walks
of length k, Fk, into three subsets:
• The first subset is denoted as A1, where A1 ⊆ Fk and for any f ∈ A1, for any
a, b ∈ {0, 1, ..., l(f)− 1}, if a is immediately followed by b in the sequence of nodes
in the motif f , then b is never immediately followed by a in the sequence. For
example, motif 1 and 3 in Table A.1.
• The second subset is denoted as A2, where A2 = F kk \ A1, and F kk is the set of
motifs inducing walks of length k with k distinct nodes. For example, motif 2 and
4 in Table A.1.
• The third subset is denoted as A3, where A3 = Fk \ (A1∪A2). For example, motif
5 in Table A.1.
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From definition of the three subsets, we know that they are distinct subsets of Fk, and





















































T ) = 1).














We first consider the subset A1. For any motif fi ∈ A1, by definition of A1, the
probability that a walk associated with fi exists is p
k in the network G or (G + GT ),
i.e. P (Xij(G) = 1) = p
k, for any j = 1, 2, ..., hi(G), and P (X
i
j(G + G
T ) = 1) = pk,
for any j = 1, 2, ..., hi(G + G
T ). Since hi(G + G













P (Xij(G) = 1) = 0. (A.8)














We then consider the subset A2. From the definition of A2, we know that there are
exactly (k−1) number of distinct motifs in A2, i.e. |A2| = k−1. For any motif fi ∈ A2,
since fi ∈ F kk , we know that hi(G) = P (n, k), and hi(G+GT ) = 2kP (n, k). Since motifs
in A2 consist of k distinct nodes, one ordered pair of nodes and its reverse pair present
exactly once in any motif in A2. We denote such pairs of nodes as (u, v) and (v, u).
The probability that a walk associated with fi ∈ A2 exists is pk in the network G, i.e.
P (Xij(G) = 1) = p
k, for any j = 1, 2, ..., hi(G). However, the probability that a walk
associated with fi ∈ A2 exists in the multigraph (G+GT ) is either pk or pk−1. Consider
the pair of nodes u and v such that both (u, v) and (v, u) appear in fi, and focus on the
link between (u, v) and the link between (v, u). For a walk Xij(G+G
T ) associated with
motif fi ∈ A2, two cases might happen: (1) if both links between the pair of nodes are
from G or both links are from GT , then P (Xij(G + G
T ) = 1) = pk−1; (2) if one of the
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links is from G and the other one is from GT , then P (Xij(G+G
T ) = 1) = pk. We can
also see that half of the walks associated with a motif fi ∈ A2 follow case (1), while the





























P (Xij(G) = 1)
=(k − 1)2k−1P (n, k)(1− p)pk−1
≤(k − 1)2k−1P (n, k)pk−1.
(A.9)
We finally consider the subset A3. Motifs in A3 have at most k − 1 nodes. We
only consider the multigraph (G + GT ) in the following discussion. For a walk with l
nodes, we need at least l− 1 links with distinct pairs of end points to ensure the walk is
connected. Therefore, the probability of the existence of a walk with l nodes is at most









pl−1 = 2kP (n, l)pl−1.
Since 0 ≤ k < n and p ≥ 1n−k+1 , we know that for any 2 ≤ l ≤ k − 1, (n − l + 1)p ≥
(n − k + 1)p ≥ 1, and therefore 2kP (n, l)pl−1 increases in l. Since l ≤ k − 1 for motifs





T ) = 1) ≤ 2kP (n, k − 1)pk−2.
The number of distinct motifs in A3 is at most (k − 1)k, since mk ≤ 1 + (k − 1)k and


























P (Xij(G) = 1) ≤ (k−1)k2kP (n, k−1)pk−2.
(A.10)
Combine results from equation (A.8), (A.9) and (A.10), we conclude that when













≤ (k−1)2k−1P (n, k)pk−1+(k−1)k2kP (n, k−1)pk−2.
This finishes the proof of part (ii).
A.3.6 Proof of Proposition 5.2
Proof. Our proof is based on the following version of Chernoff bounds: Let X1, ..., Xn be





i=1 pi, then for any 0 < δ < 1, P (X ≤ (1 − δ)µ) ≤ e
−µδ
2
2 , and P (X ≥
(1 + δ)µ) ≤ e−
µδ2
3 .
For Erdös-Renyi network G, the in/out degree of a node can be viewed as the
sum of (n − 1) i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables. For simplicity of the proof, we can
approximate it as the sum of n i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables, and this will not
impact the proceeding of the proof. For any fixed node v, applying the Chernoff bound
gives
P (deg+/−(v) ≤ (1− δ(n))c(n) log n) ≤ e−
δ(n)2c(n) logn
2 ,
P (deg+/−(v) ≥ (1 + δ(n))c(n) log n) ≤ e−
δ(n)2c(n) logn
3 .
By union bound, the probability that any node in G has in/out degree less than (1 −
δ(n))c(n) log n is at most ne−
δ(n)2c(n) logn
2 , and the probability that any node in G has
in/out degree greater than (1 + δ(n))c(n) log n is at most ne−
δ(n)2c(n) logn
3 . Since c(n)
is a function of n such that limn→∞ c(n) = +∞ and c(n) log n < n for all n, and









2 = 0, and
∞∑
n=1










3 = 0, and
∞∑
n=1






Thus by Borel-Cantelli Lemma, we know that asymptotically almost surely, every node
has in/out degree within the range of [(1− δ(n))c(n) log n, (1 + δ(n))c(n) log n].
A.4 Proofs of Main Results for Erdös-Renyi Random Net-
works
Before proving the main theorems in Section 5.1, we first review the expression of
expected regret, and show some general bounds of the expected regret that are useful
in the proofs.







































































































































A.4.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof. Given any sequence p, we will have a sequence of Erdös-Renyi random networks
G. Corresponding to the sequence of networks (G+GT ), there is a sequence of spectral
norms ‖G+GT ‖.
In the following proof, we first show that under two different assumptions of the
sequence of spectral norms, the expected regret EG[R(p0)] = o(n). We then argue that
for any sequence of probabilities p, we can decompose the sequence into two subse-
quences, such that each subsequence satisfies one of the two assumptions. Therefore,
we can derive the bounds of expected regrets for the two subsequences individually, and
combine the two bounds to obtain a general upper bound of the expected regret.
Case 1. We first assume that ‖G + GT ‖ = ω(np) almost surely. From equation
(A.15) we obtain an upper bound of the expected regret. Since G is non-empty, therefore
‖G+GT ‖ ≥ 1.3
We now consider two possible sub-cases. When np = o(1), since ‖G + GT ‖ ≥ 1,

























n(n− 1)p(1− 3p+ 2np).
Since we assume that np = o(1), therefore
EG[R(p0)] = o(n).
3 Consider a network G with n nodes and only one link, for example, G is a n× n matrix with 1 at
the ijth element for a given pair (i, j) and 0 elsewhere. Then (G+GT ) is a matrix with 1 at the ijth and
jith element and 0 elsewhere. Let ei denote a n-dimension unit vector that has 1 in the ith position and







a non-empty network (with at lease one link) has spectral norm greater than or equal to 1.
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n(n− 1)p(1− 3p+ 2np).














Case 2. We next assume that ‖G + GT ‖ = O(np) almost surely. By equation
(5.2.2), ‖G+GT ‖ ≥ (2 + o(1))np almost surely. This implies that ‖G+GT ‖ = Θ (np)
almost surely. We claim that in this case, np = ω(1), or equivalently p = ω(n−1).
Otherwise if there is a subsequence {n′} ⊆ {n} such that n′p(n′) = O(1), then from
the asymptotic spectral results in Section 5.2.2, we know that ‖G(n′) + G(n′)T ‖ =
(2 + o(1))
√
∆ = ω(n′p(n′)) almost surely, which contradicts with the assumption that
‖G+GT ‖ = O(np) almost surely.








(EG[R1(p0,K(n, p))] + EG[R2(p0,K(n, p))]) ,




















































, where dxe represents the smallest integer that is
greater than or equal to x. The choice of K(n, p) implies that K(n, p) = o(n).











Since ‖G+GT ‖ ≥ (2+o(1))np almost surely, from equation (A.16), EG[R1(p0,K(n, p))]

























(k − 1)2k−1P (n, k)pk−1 + (k − 1)k2kP (n, k − 1)pk−2
]
.













































o(log(np)). This implies that K(n, p)K(n,p) = o(np). Also because np = ω(1), K(n, p) =
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ω(1). Noticing that ρ ∈ (0, 1), therefore ρK(n,p) = o(1). Also since np = ω(1), therefore
p−1 = o(n). This implies that
EG[R1(p0,K(n, p))] = O(p
−1) = o(n). (A.19)













































n(n− 1)p(1− 3p+ 2np).
Since K(n, p) = ω(1) and ρ ∈ (0, 1), therefore ρK(n,p)+1 = o(1). Also in this case
np = ω(1). This implies that
EG[R2(p0,K(n, p))] = o(n). (A.21)
Combining equation (A.19) and (A.21),
EG[R(p0)] = o(n).
In this way, we show that the expected regret grows at the rate o(n) under as-
sumption ‖G + GT ‖ = ω(np) almost surely or assumption ‖G + GT ‖ = O(np) almost
surely.
We now consider a general probability sequence p(n), and the sequence of spectral
norms ‖G(n) +G(n)T ‖ induced by p(n). We call a subsequence {n′} ⊆ {n} a maximal
subsequence associated with ω(np(n)) if, we can not find any subsequence {m′} ⊆
{n} \ {n′} such that ‖G(m′) +G(m′)T ‖ = ω(m′p(m′)) almost surely. Similarly, we call
a subsequence {n′} ⊆ {n} a maximal subsequence associated with O(np(n)) if, we can
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not find any subsequence {m′} ⊆ {n}\{n′} such that ‖G(m′)+G(m′)T ‖ = O(m′p(m′))
almost surely. We point that such choices of maximal subsequences are not unique.
For the sequence of spectral norms with indexes {n}, we find two subsequences
with indexes {n1} and {n2}, where {n1} is a maximal subsequence associated with
ω(np(n)), and {n2} is a maximal subsequence associated with O(np(n)). Note that
one of the two subsequences can be empty, but they cannot both be empty subse-
quences. Assume that there exists a subsequence {m} ⊆ {n} \ ({n1} ∪ {n2}). If
‖G(m) + G(m)T ‖ = ω(mp(m)) almost surely, then this violates the definition of {n1}.
If ‖G(m)+G(m)T ‖ 6= ω(mp(m)) almost surely, then there exists a subsequence {m1} ⊆
{m} such that ‖G(m1) + G(m1)T ‖ = O(m1p(m1)) almost surely, and this violates
the definition of {n2}. Therefore, there does not exist any subsequence {m} such
that {m} ⊆ {n} \ ({n1} ∪ {n2}). In other words, there are finitely many elements in
{n} \ ({n1} ∪ {n2}). Without loss of generality, we can assume that {n} = {n1} ∪ {n2}
and this will not influence our limiting results.
The subsequence {n1} satisfies the condition that ‖G(n1) + G(n1)T ‖ = ω(n1p(n1))
almost surely and therefore within the subsequence {n1}, EG[R(p0)] = o(n1). The
subsequence {n2} satisfies the condition that ‖G(n2) + G(n2)T ‖ = O(n2p(n2)) almost
surely and therefore within the subsequence {n2}, EG[R(p0)] = o(n2). The combination
of the two subsequence traverses the whole sequence of networks. This implies that the
expected regret EG[R(p0)] = o(n) for any sequence of probabilities p(n).
From equation (5.7), we know that π∗ = Θ(n). Therefore, the expected fraction
regret









A.4.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2




for some ε > 0 and
p = ω(n−2), from equation (5.6) we know that ‖G+GT ‖ = Θ(1) almost surely. This is
because in this range of network densities, the network is very fragmented and the size
of components are small, limiting the maximum degree of the network. From equation
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n(n− 1)p(1− 3p+ 2np). (A.22)
















This implies the upper bound EG[R(p0)] = O(n
2p).
We now provide the matching lower bound on the expected regret. Since ‖G+GT ‖ =




















This implies that EG[R(p0)] = Ω(n
2p). Combining the upper and lower bounds gives
the expected regret EG[R(p0)] = Θ(n
2p).
We next prove the rate for expected fractional regret. From equation (5.7), we know
that π∗ = Θ(n). Thus the expected fractional regret









Thus we finish the proof the theorem.
A.4.3 Proof of Theorem 5.3
Proof. Consider the case when p = Θ(n−1). From equation (5.6) we know that ‖G +





almost surely. From equation (A.15) we obtain an upper bound






































n(n− 1)p(1− 3p+ 2np). (A.23)




















Equation (A.3) holds as the lower bound of EG[R(p0)]. Without loss of generality we
assume p = wn for some constant w > 0. Since p =
w
n , and ‖G+G
























































From equation (5.7), the optimal profit π∗ = Θ(n). Thus we can compute the
expected fractional regret














A.4.4 Proof of Theorem 5.4
Proof. In accordance with Proposition 5.2, we assume p = c(n) lognn , where c(n) is a
function of n such that limn→∞ c(n) = +∞ and c(n) log n < n for all n. Actually every
sequence of p in this range can be represented in this way.
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From equation (5.6), when p = c(n) lognn , ‖G+G
T ‖ = (2 + o(1))np = Θ(np) almost
surely. This satisfies the condition in Case 2 in Section A.4.1, the proof of Theorem
5.1. Following the proof idea in Theorem 5.1, we can decompose the expected regret
EG [R(p0)] into two parts, as specified in equation (A.16) and (A.17). For p =
c(n) logn
n ,








, where dxe represents the small-
est integer that is greater than or equal to x.
Since K(n, p)K(n,p) = o(np), K(n, p) = ω(1) and ρK(n,p) = o(1), therefore the upper
bound of EG[R1(p0,K(n, p))] given by equation (A.19) still holds. Thus we can further
write equation (A.19) as







We next provide a tighter upper bound for EG[R2(p0,K(n, p))], which is given by
equation (A.17). We decompose G1 = c(n) log n1 + ζ1, and G
T1 = c(n) log n1 + ζ2,
where ζ1 and ζ2 denote the differences between the in/out degree and average in/out
degree of the random network G. This also implies that (G+GT )1 = 2c(n) log n1 +










































By Proposition 5.2, every element in vector ζ1 and ζ2 is upper bounded by δ(n)c(n) log n
asymptotically almost surely, where δ(n) = Θ( 1√
c(n)



















































Proposition 5.2, every element in vector ζ1 is lower bounded by −δ(n)c(n) log n asymp-


































































We subtract equation (A.25) from (A.24), and obtain the following difference:
A−B ≤ S1 − S2 + (1− δ(n) + 2δ(n))
2ρc(n) log n
‖G+GT ‖






S1 − S2 + 2δ(n)2ρc(n) logn‖G+GT ‖ A
1− (1− δ(n))2ρc(n) logn‖G+GT ‖
, a.a.s.
Since ‖G + GT ‖ = (2 + o(1))np = Θ(np) almost surely, therefore taking expectations
on both sides,
EG[A−B] ≤
EG[S1 − S2] + 2δ(n)2ρc(n) lognΘ(np) EG(A)




EG[S1 − S2] + Θ(1)δ(n)EG(A)
Θ(1)
. (A.26)














From part (i) of Proposition 5.1, EG[S1 − S2] ≥ 0. Since ‖G+GT ‖ ≥ (2 + o(1))np
almost surely, therefore














From part (ii) of Proposition 5.1, we obtain an upper bound





K(n, p)2K(n,p)P (n,K(n, p) + 1)pK(n,p)
+ K(n, p)K(n,p)+12K(n,p)+1P (n,K(n, p))pK(n,p)−1
]
.
Since P (n, k) ≤ nk, therefore







Because K(n, p)K(n,p) = o(np) and K(n, p) = ω(1),


























































Now we compare the rate of δ(n)ρK(n,p) and 1c(n) logn . By Proposition 5.2, δ(n) =
Θ( 1√
c(n)
). Also K(n, p) can be approximated by
√
log(c(n) log n). Since
log log(
√











where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant as defined before. This further implies that√































From equation (A.26), (A.27) and (A.29),






This is equivalent to






Combining the upper bound for EG[R1(p0,K(n, p))] and EG[R2(p0,K(n, p))], we con-
clude that






Now we provide a matching lower bound for EG [R(p0)]. From equation (A.13), we
get the expression for EG [R(p0)]. If we only evaluate the geometric series at k = 2,

















































































Combining the upper bound of EG[R(p0)], we conclude that







Since from equation (5.7), the optimal profit π∗ = Θ(n). Therefore, the expected
fractional regret














Since we assume p = c(n) lognn , therefore our conclusion is equivalent to the statement
in Theorem 5.4.
A.5 Proofs of Results for Random Networks with General
Degree Distributions
A.5.1 Proof of Theorem 6.1
We first introduce the following lemma to provide a lower bound on the spectral norm
of the matrix. We will use this lemma to prove the theorem.
Lemma A.1. For any symmetric, non-negative n × n matrix A, assume that i∗ =
arg max1≤i≤n
∑n









The following inequality holds because adding more constraints leads to a lower bound
of ‖A‖.
‖A‖ ≥ max
‖ξ‖=1, ξj=0 for j∈{j:j 6=i∗,ai∗j=0}
ξTAξ = ‖A1‖,




Since A1 is a strongly connected graph, according to Perron-Frobenius Theorem, the






Now we define A2 as a sub-matrix of A1, with all elements other than the i
∗th row and
















We now provide the complete proof of Theorem 6.1.
Proof. Let i∗ = arg max1≤i≤n
∑n
j=1 (Gij +Gji). Since (G + G
T ) is a symmetric and


























































Now we compute the expected number of walks of length 2 in the network (G + GT ).
Each walk of length 2 includes one middle node and two of its possibly repeated edges.
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So the number walks of length 2 involving an arbitrary middle node v is deg(v)2, where
deg(v) is the in/out-degree of node v in the network (G+GT ). Therefore, the expected



























From equation (5.7), we know that π∗ = Θ(n). Therefore, the expected fraction
regret














A.5.2 Proof of Theorem 6.2
Proof. We apply Theorem 6.1 to prove the theorem. Particularly, the proof for different
values of α is different. We use a1, ..., an to denote the in-degree sequence and b1, ..., bn
to denote the out-degree sequence.
Assume that X is a random variable following the distribution specified in equation




















Since α > 2, we know that E(X) = Θ(1).
Now we calculate the second moment of X. Different values of α lead to different




































Θ(n3−α), if 2 < α < 3;
Θ(log n), if α = 3;
Θ(1), if α > 3.
In multigraph (G+GT ), we calculate the expected degree as
E(di) = E(ai) + E(bi) = 2E(ai).
and the variance of the degree as
Var(di) = Var(ai)+Var(bi)+2Cov(ai, bi) = (2+2ρa,b)Var(ai) = (2+2ρa,b)(E(a
2
i )−(E(ai))2).
Therefore, the second moment of the degree distribution is given by:





Θ(n3−α), if 2 < α < 3;
Θ(log n), if α = 3;
Θ(1), if α > 3.




Θ(n3−α), if 2 < α < 3;
Θ(log n), if α = 3;
Θ(1), if α > 3.
(A.33)
Now we calculate the bounds for the expected regret and expected fractional regret.
By Law of Total Probability, we know that for any small enough δ > 0, the expected





























We first compute EG
[
R(p0)





(Gij +Gji) = max
1≤i≤n






we can choose ξ(n) = xminn
1−δ
α−1 .

































, if α > 3.
We then compute EG
[
R(p0)
∣∣∣max1≤i≤n ai < xminn 1−δα−1 ] . Because G is non-empty,
we know that max1≤i≤n
∑n
j=1 (Gij +Gji) ≥ 1. Therefore we can define ξ(n) = 1.













O(n4−α), if 2 < α < 3;
O(n log n), if α = 3;
O(n), if α > 3.
To complete the calculation of the expected regret, we calculate the probabilities in


















































Therefore, based on equation (A.34), we can derive the bounds for expected regret




























































, if α > 3.
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α−1 ), if 2 < α < 3;
O(n−
1−δ







, if α > 3.
The above expressions for expected regret and expected fractional regret is equivalent
















, if α > 3,
















, if α > 3,
for any ε > 0.
Since ε can take any small enough positive value, this further implies that the ex-
pected regret EG[R(p0)] = o(n), and the expected fractional regret EG[RF (p0)] =
o(1).
